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工p, Karl Tat Leung. The Historicity of Sense in Husserl ‘ s 
Crisis. M.Phil. Thesis. The Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
June 1990. Instructor: Dr Kwan Tze-Wan. 
The present writing ventures into a study of Husserl‘s 
phenomenology of history operated and presented in the Crisis, 
especially in the Origin included in it. The introduction 
attempts to delimit and intro our theme. In section one, we 
delimit our theme in three abstractions and, in section two, 
we introduce it by setting it within its initial broad back-
ground . T h e history is shown to be a pure history of sense. 
Our task is to investigate this history and its possibilities. 
We first give, in chapter I, a proper determination to the 
sense. Then we will devote chapter IV to history and chapters 
11, III, V to its possibilities. 
Chapter I determines the sense as ideal Objectivity. In 
section one, we establish the necessity of determining sense 
as ideal Objectivity and, in section two, we shown the signif— 
icance of the genesis of ideal Objectivity. In section three, 
the ideal Objectivity receives an exploration. It is defined 
and proved to be lingual in division A, and is differentiated 
into three levels. The problem of possibilities is abstracted 
as two moments: the possibilities of absolute ideality and 
that of absolute Objectivity. 
Chapters 工工 and II deals with the problem of absolute 
Objectivity which is again abstracted as two moments: the 
origin and the tradition. Chapter 工工 proves that language and 
the living present are the conditions of possibility for an 
original genesis of absolute Objectivity. In section one, the 
pure possibility of lingual expressibility is shown to be the 
essential characteristic of the absolute Objectivity. In 
section two, we plunge into the original language, human 
existence and world. Division A reveals that both the world 
and mankind are horizons, and the latter stands out against 
the former. Division B makes manifest that the common language 
is a horizon standing out against mankind and hence the world 
so that both of them are lingual. Then, in section three, the 
origj.nal constitution of absolute Objectivity is traced. 
Division A shows that the living present provides psychical 
validity. Division B shows that speech provides interpsychical 
validity. Finally, division C shows that writing provides 
absolute validity. 
Chapter III proves that sedimentation, reactivation and 
univocity are the conditions of possibility of a tradition of 
absolute Objectivity. Section one shows that origin and tradi-
tion are interenveloped. Section two works out the concepts of 
sedimentation and reactivation. The interplay of them with 
( V 
original genesis is shown in division A to be the original 
mode of language. Two derivative modes, namely, passivity and 
logicality, are explained in division B. Several implications 
concerning language and sense are drawn in division C. We 
bring in, in section three, the most concrete determination of 
constitutive language. In division A, univocity is determined 
as an ultimate condition of sedimentation and reactivation. In 
division B, univocity is illuminated as an infinite telos. A 
primordial temporalization of the living present at the lin-
gual and historical level operates in sedimentation and reac-
tivation. The univocal language and the living present are the 
ultimate conditions of possibility for the absolute Objectivi-
七Y. 
Chapter VI determines history as the all-encompassing 
ultimate horizon. Section one develops explicitly the primor-
dial temporalization of history. History is shown to be the 
vital movement, totalized at our present, of the interweaving 
of original sense—formations and sedimentations. Section two 
reveals the horizon as the concrete form of history--the 
dialectic of our present and the implication of totalization 
and projection. Section three proves that the real history of 
fact is abstract movement of the pure history of sense. 
Chapter V traces the condition for absolute ideality as 
idealization. In section one, we distinguish idealization and 
Idea from factuality. In section two, we first distinguish 
them further from static essentiality and then delve into a 
positive determination. Eventuality, idealization is shown to 
be an unceasing unifying and Idea the unifying sense. Ideali-
zation is the condition of possibility of the absolute ideali-
ty, i.e.. Idea. 
The conclusion recapitulates, in section one, all the 
arguments and theses, and furnishes finally a whole picture of 
history. In section two, we a r t i c u l a t e an interplay of 
presence and absence on the margin of Husserl's phenomenology. 
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§1. The Delimitation of the Investigation 
Our present and forthcoming endeavour moves within the 
thinking horizon set up by the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938)• As this phenomenology was cultivated, refined, 
developed and forever renewed by Husserl for nearly fifty 
years of meditation, an abundant set of interdependent con— 
cepts and a crisscross field of interdependent problems are 
instituted, in which concepts and problems fade and arise, 
with their meanings shading into each other to form an inter-
woven nexus. Although one may for convenience divide the 
whole train of Husserl‘s phenomenology into several "phases", 
one should be warned that a correct understanding of each 
phase requires reference backward and forward to other phases. 
The present writing concentrates its whole energy only upon 
the historical phenomenology Husserl enthusiastically engaged 
in in his last years. This last meditation of Husserl, being 
developed out of his previous thinking inwardly, though simul-
taneously echoed outwardly with the socio-political situation 
and the philosophical scene, will necessarily make use of and 
at the same time transform those previous phenomenological 
concepts such as intentionality, constitution and reproduc-
tion. Accordingly, a making use and transforming of them in 
this essay is inevitable. Nevertheless, an explicit themati-
zation of them requires nothing less than a careful and thor-
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ough study of the whole movement of Husserl‘s thought, which 
cannot be accomplished here; hence, this essay only involves 
them in an implicit manner. It follows that we are moving in 
the present writing upon an abstraction. 
Anyone who is even just a bit familiar with the philo-
sophical writings of Husserl up until the "Krisis"^ period 
cannot help but discovering in the writings from that period 
new terminologies, together with a novel nexus of articula-
tion of the new with the old ones. In the most fascinating 
complexes of terms would no doubt be those concerning history 
and 1ifeWorld [Lebenswelt]. A mere glimpse of the Crisis may 
suggest that part I and II of the text, which clarify and 
trace to its origin the "crisis" phenomenon through dis— 
playing the complexes of terms concerning history, serve only 
as a convenient, hence replaceable, preparatory pathway to-
wards, but contribute nothing to, the "Sachen" of philosophy; 
whereas part III, especially part III A which deals with the 
lifeworld, asserts upon the "Sachen" of philosophy, provides 
new and refines early systematic doctrines of philosophy, but 
with no innovation in method. However, just a not all-total 
careless and irresponsible reading reveals that they are by no 
means the case. Regarding the complex of historical terms, 
first<of all, the display of the complex at least practises an 
1 • Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die 
transzendentale Phanomenoloaie. Eine Einleituna in de Phanomenolo-
cfische PhilosoDhie. ed. Walter Biemel. Husserliana Band VI (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff: 1954, 1962) , hereafter cited as Kr. • Eng-
lish translation: The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, tr. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1970) , hereafter abbreviated as Crisis in the text and cited 
as Cr. • Husserl started to reflect on the themes in Crisis in 1934 
and began its composition in 1936 until the summer of 1937, when 
his terminal illness began. 
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implicit knowledge of history, if not lifting it up to an 
explicit knowledge in a philosophy of history. The historical 
reflection upon philosophy displayed through the complex 
projects, and itself cultivates, history as a problematic. 
And we cannot see in advance that the whole nexus of reflec-
tion involved finally culminates in an innovative historico— 
philosophical understanding of mankind. The history of phi-
losophy and the philosophy of history merge into each other 
and result in a historical philosophy. Besides, one would 
suspect reasonably, having carefully and responsibly read 
through the text, whether it is as obvious as one would other— 
wise conceive, or even whether it is possible, that the prob-
lematic of the lifeworld can be severed from the historical 
reflection without affecting the being of the latter. At any 
rate, the first point alone succeeds in rejecting the first of 
the above-mentioned misunderstanding. Regarding the problem-
atic of the lifeworld, the fact that a considerable portion of 
part III A is devoted to revise the transcendental reduction 
makes it safe for us to construe that the lifeworld can be 
anything but a theme among many which can be thematized by an 
already constructed reduction; on the contrary, it prescribes 
a conpeption of reduction. In addition, one is justified to 
suspect if the lifeworld can retain its being, not merely be 
discovered, with the rapture of the historical reflection. In 
any case, the first point alone succeeds in rejecting the 
second of the above-mentioned misunderstanding. Let us take a 
concise summary. Speaking abstractly, the historical reflec-
tion is not a mere method which can be applied indifferently 
to any content； rather it projects its own content. The 
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lifeworld is not a mere content which can be thematized by an 
already constructed method; rather it prescribes its own 
method. Speaking concretely, the very being of the historical 
reflection and the lifeworld envelop each other. It follows 
that the historical reflection and the lifeworld taken togeth-
er contribute to an innovation of phenomenology. Of course, 
all these have only been alluded to - they remain to be 
proved. Abstractly speaking, the four different points picked 
up above correspond to four different tasks. But, concretely 
speaking, since the two complexes interweave together and form 
a nexus of articulation within the Crisis, every clarification 
of each point must involve the others； hence, we have nothing 
but c^e single task. Nevertheless, the present writing con— 
fines its thematic light only to the problematic of history, 
and in doing so, may throw a dim light upon the interrelation 
between history and lifeworld; whereas the problematic of 
lifeworld is tacitly put in an excess of darkness. Thus, it 
is upon another abstraction that the present itinerary is 
conducted. 
Furthermore, confining ourselves to the problematic of 
history, the present essays by no means claims to exhaust the 
whole^ field. In the Crisis, Husserl engages in a historical 
reflection in the midst of a life—crisis of humanity manifest— 
ed as a cultural crisis, and strives to throw light on the 
situation by bringing us back to the original sense of philos— 
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ophy and science. The Vienna Lecture^ traces philosophy back 
to its primordial, original genesis as a sense of the Greek 
culture. In the part II of Crisis delineates the subtle 
transformation of this original sense in the modern period. 
In this way, Husserl furnishes us with a history of philoso— 
phy, indeed, a history of humanity, which can be employed to 
elucidate the crisis of humanity as expressed in the crisis of 
philosophy. However, the historical regressive inquiry 
[Riickfrage] , which results in a history of philosophy and, 
subsequently, a theory of the crisis of modern humanity, 
itself practises a philosophy of history. Seldom, though not 
at all never, does Husserl reflect upon the Riickfraae itself 
and clarify the notion of history involved, not to speak of 
investigating into the possibility of that history. Roughly 
speaking, within the problematic of history, Husserl provides 
us with three levels of thematization, though inteirmingled 
with each other: (1) the crisis and its explanation and solu-
tion, (2) the history of philosophy, of culture, or of humani-
ty and its thematization, and (3) a philosophy of history 
which articulates a notion of history and investigates into 
the formal structure and the concrete conditions of possibili-
ty of this notion of history. The first presupposes the 
second whereas the second presupposes the third. And our sole 
l.The Vienna Lecture refers to the reworked text of the lecture given by 
Husserl in May, 1935. It is edited under the title "Die Krisis der 
europaischen Menschentums und die Philosophie" as the third Abhan-
dung in Krisis, pp. 314-348. TVo English translations: (1) "Philoso-
phy and the Crisis of European Man" in Phenomenology and the Crisis 
of Philosophy, ed. & tr. Quetin Lauer (N.Y. : Harper & Row, 1965), 
pp. 149-92 • (2) "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity" as 
appendix 工 in Crisis, pp. 269-99. The second version will be used 
and is abbreviated as The Vienna Lecture in the text and PCH in 
citation. 
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aim in the present writing is to throw light on the third 
level of thematization, although each of them mutually in-
cludes the others. Therefore, again there is an abstraction 
upon which we are proceeding. 
In summary, we first have an abstraction from all of 
Husserl丨s thought before the "Crisis" period, then one from 
the problematic of the lifeworld, and finally one from the 
interpretation and clarification of the history of philosophy 
and the crisis of philosophy, of culture, and of humanity 
respectively. Yet, it cannot be overemphasized that what is 
abstracted is never cut off from the remaining, but each 
mutually imply the other implicitly. In this manner, the 
presejjt writing, if it succeeds in what it endeavours to 
accomplish thematically, will disclose nothing more nor less 
than the entire problematic of history as Husserl has got a 
vision of it. Nevertheless, accompanied with the thematiza-
tion, a fund of concepts not belonging directly to the prob-
lematic of history will also be tacitly worked upon, the 
richness of it can serve studies of other aspects of Husserl»s 
phenomenology. So this essay may be seen as an initial step 
towards a specific manner, namely, taking the last phase as a 
Gentry of interpretation, of the total clarification and 
understanding of the phenomenology of the great master Edmund 
Husserl - a forever servant of humanity so honest, so serious 
and so humble. 
6 
§2. Preparatory Considerations 
In this section, we attempt to suminarize briefly and 
succinctly Husserl‘s interpretation of the history of humanity 
and philosophy. Our account never claims to be exhaustive and 
does not follow the actual chain of the presentation in The 
Vienna Lecture and the corresponding texts in Crisis. since 
it ineluctably makes use of words or concepts which intertwine 
together as the problematic of history we will venture into in 
our main text, this summary will serve as an introduction to 
these concepts by setting them within a broader background 
from which it is initially articulated. 
Men always live, as much in the beginning as nowadays and 
in th^ future, with an original natural practical attitude, 
having a fundamental historical mode of human existence. Men 
obviously always live in communities and are engaged in commu-
nal cultural activities. The natural life always naively and 
straightforwardly is directed toward this or that affair, with 
some particular ends in view, sometimes even electing a life-
vocation. The whole life-praxis furnishes with various situa-
tionally dependent criteria: we could distinguish the real 
from the illusory, the true from the false, the good from the 
bad, "fhe beautiful from the ugly, and so forth. It is in a 
particular surrounding world that we display our natural life 
which remains bound, to soitie peirsonal interests, purposes and 
goals, and to a tradition. The natural men have only finite 
tasks. 
In ancient Greece, the theoretical attitude was born. A 
reorientation of the original attitude, an Umstelluna of the 
original Einstelluncr, broke out such that an astonishment 
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toward, instead of the previous engagement in, the world and 
the worldly life was accomplished for the first time. Men 
started to wonder and continue to be so whether what is held 
to be real by the tradition is actually real, what is held to 
be true is actually true, and so on. Idealization takes place 
which constitutes such 工deals as the what-is-in-itself and the 
truth-in-itself. Philosophy, or science, is instituted: it is 
all-encompassing universal science of the totality of all that 
is, which strives for the absolute and objective episteme and 
cuts itself off from the relative and subjective doxa. Hence-
forth, the practical life is idealized so as to bring about 
Ideas such as the genuine good, the absolute beauty, etc. 
Guided, by. the infinite Ideas, the scientific culture revolu-
tionizes the whole originally spiritual cultural mode of human 
existence. All spiritual performance and achievement are set 
free from every factual bondage and are given the dignity of 
universality and supra—spatiotemporality, and they all signify 
an unheard-of historicity of human cultural life, an unheard-
of tradition of ideal truth and norm. A humanity is legiti-
mized which signifies men with infinite tasks. 
In this way, philosophy is at the first time constituted 
in concrete intentional acts and is constituted as having an 
original sense which is the sense of the original constituting 
acts: man strives for universal knowledge of man and world 
through rational insights, and then shapes rationally our 
ethical, political and social life as well as the surrounding 
world. But philosophy is itself an Idea, indeed, the Idea: 
"we must certainly distinguish between philosophy as histori-
cal fact at a given time and philosophy as idea, as the idea 
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of an infinite task" (PCH, Cr. AppI, p. 291, Kr. p. 338). 
"Philosophy ••• encompasses all ideals and the total ideal, 
i.e., the universe of all norms" (PCH, Cr.AppI, p. 289, Kr. 
P- 336)• Philosophy as the Idea of all Ideas signifies in-
finity and totality: it unifies and places all Ideas in an 
unending movement. It is a telos, that is, a perfect and 
ultimate end, which remains forever the infinite pole to-
wards which all theoretical and practical Ideas as well as 
the total Idea of all these Ideas approach. Therefore, 
philosophy as the universal task of episteme, of rational 
knowing and living, is the teleological sense of the humani-
ty as such. Taking the two points together, it seems that 
philo 鸟 oplxy is paradoxical since it is at once the origin and 
the telos of the unending movement of humanity and so an 
unsurpassable infinity is inserted which will destroy phi-
losophy. However, philosophy is also the unending movement 
itself which bridges the origin and the telos. The entire 
history of philosophy is the forever struggling towards 
clarity of the at once original and teleological sense. 
Unifying all sciences and cultures and conferring a sense 
upon them, the philosophy "has constantly to exercise its 
functions as one which is archontic for the mankind as a 
whole"(Ibid.)• The history of philosophy and the history of 
humanity are by their very m e a n i n g s n e c e s s a r i l y merged 
together: philosophy is the innermost and essential motiva-
tion of the culturo—historical movement whereas history is 
the culturo—spiritual manifestation of philosophy. 
We can extract from the above summary that the history of 
humanity, which is articulated essentially by the history of 
9 
philosophy, is not a flux of events arisen and passed away 
causally. The history as a whole is an infinite process of a 
sense towards an Idea; yet the sense and the Idea, both being 
the One Philosophy, are identically one. This at once origi-
nal and teleological sense of the history was once constituted 
or instituted in concrete intentionality for the first time. 
Speaking not so much in the most encompassing and ultimate 
manner we have so far been, each branch of culture, guided by 
the universal task of episteme, can be seen as a history or a 
tradition which is also an infinite movement of an original 
sense accomplished in concrete intentional act. We have thus 
picked up some essential features of the peculiarly new notion 
of hispor-Y which operates in Husserl 's historical reflections 
and which is the main theme of the present writing. Primari-
ly ^  it is a history of sense. We will venture into the con-
crete and apriori conditions of the possibility of the histo-
ricity of sense, and this history of sense itself. Our main 
text will be Crisis, especially The Origin of Geometry.^ and 
Derrida‘s I n t r o d u c t i o n " ^n excellent study on our theme. 
< � 
1-This manuscript dates from 1936 and bears no title. Eugen Fink edited 
and published it (beginning with the third paragraph) in the Revue 
internationale de philosophie, vol. I, no. 2 (Jan 15, 1939) , pp. 
203—25, under the title "Der Ursprung der Geometrie als intential-
historisches Problem" . It appears in Krisis as Beilaae I工工，pp. 365-
86, and in Crisis as appendix VI, pp. 353-78. It will be abbreviated 
as (the) Origin in the text and Or. in citations. 
2. Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl 丨 s Origin of Geometry; An Introduction 
tr. w/ preface & afterward John Leavey, Jr. (Lincoln & London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1989). Hereafter abbreviated as In 
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CHAPTER I 
SENSE AS IDEAL OBJECTIVITY 
One may complain, as it is reasonable, that the word 
"sense" is employed in Husserl»s text in an extremely fluctu-
ating way that it interweaves with many words or complexes of 
words with seeming similarities but subtle nuances. How can 
the problem of the origin of sense, the historical constitu-
tion or genesis of sense, serve as a clue to the disclosure of 
the problematic of history, if the unity of the different uses 
of the word "sense" itself suffers from dispersion, if the 
sense of sense bears an unclarity? All these signify not a 
fundamental fault but an ultimate scene of the institution of 
a sense, the legitimation of a word, in general. The sense 
performs, and simultaneously deforms, itself through each 
occurrence. (Does not the sense shiver itself in these sen-
tences?) So do not be annoyed by those unclarified or even 
unclarifiable, shifts of sense, but trace them responsibly, do 
not just cite them as they are there, but relive them, re-
institute them; and this reliving and reinstituting is the 
very living and instituting of the sense itself. 
11 
§1. The Necessity of The Determination of 
Sense as Ideal Objectivity 
Inquiring into the "what" and the "how" of the history 
of sense, Husserl has in the Origin: has: (1) determined 
tacitly and nearly unrecognizably the sense as Objectivity; 
(2) restricted its scope to the ideal Objectivity; and (3) 
shifted to ideality as the anchor of inquiry. The problem 
of the genesis of sense is transformed to that of the ideal 
Objectivity of sense. Are these simply unnoticed shifts of 
words and themes so that the question under discussion is 
falsely replaced by another one? Or do the substituting 
ones i;einaj.n the same as the substituted ones, thus the shift 
results in the tackling of the same question concealed under 
different words? Neither of them seems to be the case. 
Since the sense, instead of being determinant in its meaning 
and being already constituted, is struggling on its own way, 
is being c o n s t i t u t e d and is s e l f - c o n s t i t u t i n g , in and 
through the text (or more precisely, in and through the 
present reading and writing of the text, the reactivation of 
the meaning, or sense, of the text)• Once again we let that 
which ^we are striving to clarify resonate in our very striv-
ing: the inter—envelopment of the tradition and our living 
present. 
Why such a shift is needed here? We are asking after the 
primal institution of a tradition, the origin of sense, i.e., 
the original sense of the constituting intentional act. 
Naturally one can always investigate the structure and genesis 
of intentional consciousness without specific reference to any 
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particular object; however, regarding the sense of an act, as 
lucidly phrased by Derrida, "The primordial sense of every 
intentional act is only its final sense, i.e., the constitu-
tion of an object (in the broadest sense of these terms)“ 
(Intro, p.64). What we, the inheritor of the handed-down 
sense, have at hand is, of course, the constituted sense. So 
we must start with the constituted sense if the origin is 
sought. Now, in connection with geometrical sense, the ideal 
Objectivity belongs to its very meaning. Asking how the ideal 
Objectivity is constituted therefore contributes towards the 
ultimate clarification of the origin, and the historicity, of 
sense. 
However Husserl proceeds in the text as if the sense has 
already been constituted, only to ask how it first present 
itself oricfinaliter in the personal consciousness of the 
inventor, and subsequently objectifies itself and attains 
intersubjective and objective validity. Does not the formula— 
tion imply that the geometrical sense is constituted exclu-
sively with an egological subjectivity, such that the geomet-
rical evidence of the sense, i.e., the grasping of it with the 
consciousness of its original being-itself-there [Selbst-da], 
does not include the evidence of an ideal objectivity? It 
does not remain for us to answer as we read: 
[G]eoinetrical existence is not psychical existence; 
it does not exist as something personal within the 
personal sphere of consciousness: it is the existence 
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of what is Objectively^ there for 丨everyone'•••.Indeed, 
it has, from its primal institution [Urstiftung], an 
existence which is peculiarly supertemporal.••.This is, 
we note, an "ideal" Objectivity (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.356, 
Kr. pp.367-8). 
Thus the question is : How is ideal Objectivity generated from 
something psychical? 
< � 
1. Although David Carr contends that there is no difference in 
meaning between Gegenstand and Obiekt (Cf. p. 22, translator's 
note 1), and hence does not distinguish them in the translation, 
we will follow Dorion Cairns in translating Gegenstand by object 
and Okject by Object so that the difference in meaning, if there 
is any, will not be concealed by translation. Cairns asserts that 
there is a difference. Cf. Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 3, translator's note 2. 
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§2. The Significance of The Genesis 
of Ideal Objectivity 
Instead of plunging into the question right now, we stop 
for a while to see what bearing it has on the problematic of 
history. On the one hand, is it a factual-psychological 
question about the factual-psychological genesis of the con-
sciousness of something absolutely valid from something which 
is valid only psychically•？ On the other hand, is it a juridi— 
cal question, misguided by genetic terms, which aims at static 
structures and formal conditions of possibility? Do not both 
questions, presuppose that the sense as ideal Objectivity has 
already been constituted, as one asks how the constituted 
geometrical sense is developed in the real empirical realm 
while the other asks what conditions it needs to satisfy so as 
to be able to unfold in the empirical realm? The interconnec-
tions Husserl describes are always presupposed by any real and 
imaginary factual history, but they by no means signify the 
eidetic structures and formal conditions of possibility. 
Derrida writes: 
( ...they refer to concrete acts lived in a unique 
system of instituting implications, i.e., in a system 
that has been originally produced only once 一 that 
remains de facto and de jure, irreversible. These 
then are the interconnections-of what is, in the 
fullest sense of the word, history itself (Intro, 
p.65). 
Correlatively, the thinking Husserl engaged in is no doubt 
apriori, since it depends oii no factual history, but in no way 
transcendental in the classical sense, which searches for 
formal conditions of possibility. We speak of pure-intercon-
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nections-of history, apriori-thought-of history: does this not 
signify that they are in themselves ahistorical? Derrida (and 
Husserl) answer(s): 
Not at all, for they are nothing but possibilities of 
the appearance of history as such, outside which there 
is nothing. History itself establishes the possibility 
of its own appearing (Intro. P.66). 
Thus the questioning of the possibility of ideal Objec-
tivity signifies nothing more or less than the a priori think-
ing upon the interconnections of history. The conditions of 
ideal Objectivity are those of history. 
§3. The Meaning of Ideal Objectivity 
After exposing the significance the question of the 
possibility of ideal Objectivity bears, Husserl again post— 
pones an attempt to answer the question immediately. Rather, 
the meaning of the ideal Objectivity is explored succinctly, 
so as to lay bare which subjectivity the locus of the ideal 
Objectivity in question is. The exploration is accomplished 
in two steps: first the delimitation of ideality and then the 
stratification of three kinds of ideal objectivity. 
A. The delimitation of ideal Objectivity 
An ideality refers to, in the "Crisis" period as well as 
earlier, that which is repeatable with the evidence of being 
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identical.1 An object (in the broadest sense of the word) can be 
so if, and only if, it is constituted at the very first as valid 
once and for all, and for "everyone", i.e. , it is an identity 
self-enclosed and accomplished in the primordial intentional 
constituting acts. It follows that an ideal object is repeatable 
in indefinitely many cases because it is identical in itself as a 
sense. Repeatability follows from identity. Also follows from 
the identity the disconnection of ideal object with any duration 
of worldly time, i.e., the supratemporality of ideal object. The 
disconnection of an object with any duration of worldly time 
implies that the unity of sense of the object can be unfolded in 
any arbitrarily chosen worldly time, which is a mode of temporal-
ity Husserl called omnitemporality•2 That is , supratemporality 
implies omnitemporality. Hence identity as a sense is the 
essential characteristic of ideal objectivity, from which repeat-
ability, supratemporality, and so omnitemporality, can be de-
rived. 
Husserl then assimilates the ideal objectivity with one 
kind of human accomplishments in two steps. The first of 
1- The identity in sense and validity does not at all exhaust the 
meaning of ideal object. Idealities already shown to be valid 
could serve as basis for further production of ideality. More 
radically, each ideal truth or validity is itself always on the 
way approaching the truth-in-itself at the infinity. Cf. PCH, 
Cr.AppI pp. 277-8. The problem of infinity will preoccupy us in 
chapter V. 
2 • §64 of Experience and Judgement provides us with a detail analysis 
of different types of temporality of ideal objectivity and real 
objectivity. "The timelessness of objectivities of the understand-
ing, their being ‘ everywhere and nowhere ‘ , proves … t o be a privi-
leged form of temporality, a form which distinguishes these objec-
tivities fundamentally and essentially from individual objectivi-
ties. That is, a supertemporal unity pervades the temporal multi-
plicity within which it is situated: this supertemporalitv implies 
omnitemporality" (p. 261)• 
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which is not at all novel with respect to Husserl's other 
writings: 
[The ideal Objectivity] is proper to a whole class of 
spiritual products of the cultural world, to which not 
only all scientific formations [Gebilde] and the 
sciences themselves belong but also, for example, the 
formations of fine literature (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.356-7, 
Kr. p.368). 
Being an ideal object is not, as one would be tempted to 
think, exclusively a matter of science, but an attribute to a 
class of spiritual products. Under the title "culture" we 
encounter a vast different levels, different kinds, different 
dimensions, etc. of human performance and achievement. Then 
comes the second step: which class of spiritual product do 
science and literary art belong to, and which class can ideal 
objectivity be adequately attributed? Husserl gives an answer 
in a footnote subsequently amended to a typed—out version pre— 
pared by Fink: that which is linguallyl expressible and, hence, 
exists as lingual meaning or sense. In that footnote we read: 
[I]t belongs to their Objective being that they be 
lingually expressed and can be expressed again and 
again; or, more precisely, they have Objectivity, their 
existence—for—everyone, only as meaning, as sense of 
speech (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.357n. Kr. p.368n). 
Language moves into the focus of our science. And, again, in 
connection with geometry, we can read: 
, [The Pythagorean theorem] is identically the same in the 
"original language" of Euclid and in all "translation"; 
and within each language it is again the same,…（OrG, 
Cr.AppVI. P.357, Kr. p.368). 
1- We follow the practice of Paul Ricoeur who restricts the word 
linguistics" and all its grammatical forms to refer to matters 
concerning the scientific study of language and creates an adjec-
tive to refer to the natural language which is translated as "lingual" by 
J.P. Thompson in Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) . Cf. Thompson ‘ s note 
on translation. 
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We see that language is adhered to the ideal Objectivity not 
even in the sense of factual languages, not to speak of their 
empirical realizations into oral utterances and written docu-
ments . The adhesion of any one of these will impugn the ideal 
Objectivity. Thus, although language is introduced, the ideal 
spiritual formations and its constitution have nothing to do 
with the factuality of languages and their sensible embodi-
ments . 
Is language a, and indeed the, condition of possibility 
of the ideal Objectivity? If so, in what sense and in what 
manner? These will be answered afterwards. For the time 
being, let us raise a point mairginal to, but yet within, 
Husserl 's text, the very formulation of it is embedded in the 
setting of Husserl‘s text. We cite the sentence which follows 
immediately the last but one above-cited sentence: 
This is true in a peculiar fashion in the case of the 
Objective sciences: for them the difference between the 
original language of the work and its translation into 
other languages does not remove its identical accessi-
bility or change it into an inauthentic, indirect acces-
sibility (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.357n, Kr. p.368n). 
After attributing ideal objectivity to both science and liter— 
ary art, Husserl deprives perfect translatability from the 
latter while it is a peculiar feature of the former. The 
Pythagorean theorem is identically accessible in all its 
translations whereas Goethe‘s Faust is not so. What else 
besides the factuality of different languages can be responsi-
ble for this unauthentic accessibility^^ Then, how can one 
reconcile the conflict between the identity of sense required 
by the ideal objectivity in general and the unauthentic, 
indirect accessibility demanded by the kind of ideal objectiv-
ity displayed by literary art? How can one reconcile the 
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conflict between the reduction of all factuality of language 
required by the ideal Objectivity in general and the necessary 
tie with factuality demanded by the ideal objectivity of 
literary art? Indeed, is the ideal objectivity a suitable 
genus for the sense-formations of sciences and that of liter-
ary art to subsume under? Is it not the case that the so-
called ideal objectivity in general belongs exclusively to 
scientific formations, while the sense of the literary art is 
quite another matter? We observe a fundamental ambiguity in 
the meaning of ideal objectivity. 
B. The stratification of ideal Objectivity 
工 J} tfeis section we attempt to explore the stratification 
which Husserl differentiates within the ideal objectivity in 
general. It is first brought into light in Derrida»s Introduc-
tion. Three levels of ideal objectivity have been distinguished, 
two of which are shown to be in some definite manner necessarily 
tied to factuality. One might expect that the ideality of liter-
ary art is clarified and determined satisfactorily, only to be 
totally disappointed. The theme of literary art simply never 
drifts into the discussion, which is conducted as if the ideal 
objectjlvity, and hence that of the literary art, have been se-
cured . 
The primary level is the identity of language itself. 
[L]anguage itself, in all its particularizations (words, 
sentences, speeches) , is • • • thoroughly made up of ideal 
objectivities; for example, the word "Lowe" [lion] 
occurs only once in the German language; it is identical 
throughout its innumerable utterances by any given 
persons (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.357, Kr. p.368). 
Each unit of language is an ideal objectivity, since it is 
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identical with any of its sensible realizations, phonetic or 
graphic. The factual existence of a word, for instance, and 
even the referent, if there is any, are irrelevant in regard 
to the very being of the word, which is an ideality. The 
factual existence of a speaking subject is also redundant in 
the being of an unit of language. "Insofar as this ideal 
object confronts language as such, the latter supposes a 
spontaneous neutralization of the factual existence of the 
speaking subjects, of words, and of the thing designated" 
(Intro, p.67). Although whether there is a German speaker who 
says or writes the word "L6we" is neutralized, its being 
includes the meaning that it is a word of a factual language, 
namely German, which must be preserved in the factual subjec-
tivity of the German speaking community, though the word may 
never be used by any or even all German speakers. Thus the 
ideal objectivity of language remains tied to the factual 
existence of a language and thus the factual existence of a 
speaking community. That is, it is bounded by a certain sense of 
factuality. 
The secondary level is the ideality of the empirical 
lingual meaning of the lingual expression. The unity of 
meaning Lowe can be intended through the words "Lowe", "lion", 
"leo", etc. with evidence of being identical. And it is this 
ideal identity in meaning that legitimizes the perfect trans-
latability from one language to another. The ideality at this 
level is freed from all factual existence of any given lan-
guage and all factual lingual subjectivity. But it is by no 
means freed from any factuality. One always has to distinguish 
the object itself from the meaning and the expression, if the 
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expression refers through the meaning to an empirical object. 
The unity of meaning lion can be constituted only if there is 
a possible presentation [Gegenwartigung] or presentification 
[Vergegenwartigung] of the sensible lion.^ Without any actual or 
possible lived experience of the natural, real lion, the meaning 
lion is not possible. Hence the ideality at this level inescapa-
bly adheres to an empirical subjectivity and, so, is dated with a 
factual spatiotemporality. 
The tertiary level is the ideality of apriori object 
itself. 
[The] idealities of geometrical words, sentences, theo-
ries -consideired purely as linguistic formations - are 
not the idealities that make up what is expressed and 
brought to validity as truth in geometry； the latter are 
ideal geometrical objects, states of affairs, etc. (OrG, 
Cr.AppVI p. 357, Kr. p. 368) 
For this kind of ideality, of which the geometrical one is an 
example, the sense and the object are one. There is no tie 
with any factual spatiotemporality, with any actual and possi-
ble empirical fact. All attachment to an empirical subjectivi-
ty is dissolved. Thus we have arrived at the absolute ideal 
Objectivity which is absolutely free of all factuality. The 
question of the possibility of the ideal Objectivity attains 
its essential formulation in the absolute ideal Objectivity. 
The pu^e possibility of the ideal Objectivity can be exclu-
sively revealed in that of the absolute ideal Objectivity. It 
is because bound ideal Objectivities differ from the free one 
only in their* necessarily essential connection in whatever 
1- Geaenwartiaung is the act in which an actually present object 
is presented (e.g. perception) and Veraeaenwartiauna is the act 
in which an object not actually present is intuitively presented 
(e.g. imagination and recollection). 
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manner with factuality, and, exclusive description of their 
genesis must involve the description of facts alongside that 
of the pure possibility if and only if the description is 
complete. The inquiry into the bound ideal Objectivity adds 
nothing essential to the pure possibility exposed by inquiry 
into the absolute ideal Objectivity. If we bear in mind that 
the possibility of historicity depends on that of ideal Objec-
tivity, the inquiry into the absolute ideal Objectivity must 
purely reveal the possibility of historicity. 
We have already succeeded in getting rid of all bound 
ideality, including that of language. This means that the 
pure possibility of historicity is iminune to the factuality of 
language, whether it is a particular empirical language or 
language in general. That the absolute ideal Objectivity is 
freed from any empirical, factual subjectivity by no means 
implies that it is freed from all subjectivity but reveals 
that it is borne by a transcendental subjectivity. After all 
these determinations, now, Husserl can pose the question in 
all its clarity: 
Our problem now concerns precisely the ideal objectivi-
ties which are thematic in geometry: how does geometri-
cal ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed 
( from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a 
formation within the conscious space of the first inven-
tor 's soul, to its ideal Objectivity? (OrG, Cr.AppVI pp. 
357-8. Kr. p.369). 
23 
CHAPTER II 
THE HOW OF ORIGIN: 
LANGUAGE AND THE LIVING PRESENT 
We have shown that the origin and the transmission of 
ideal sense, which is brought to be valid as truth, amount to 
nothing but a transcendental history possessing its own tran-
scendental historicity, necessarily tied to a transcendental 
subjectivity. All possible attachment of sense and historici— 
ty to 与i:L�factuality and all factual subjectivity is detached. 
The absolute ideal Objectivity is carefully distinguished from 
all bound idealities, including the lingual ideality and the 
ideality of lingual meaning. The condition of possibility for a 
pure history is dependent upon that of the absolute ideal Objec-
tivity of sense. The guiding question is: how can something arise 
exclusively out of the psyche of an individual be objectified to 
become an absolute ideal Objectivity? 
Husserl simply answers with no tension: "... it occurs by 
means of language, through which it receives, so to speak, its 
lingual flesh [Sprachleib]" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.358, Kr p.369)！ 
How much effort one has to exert in order to neutralize lan-
guage with respect to the absolute ideality, and how surprised 
one may be if one is eventually told that language is the 
possibility in question! How paradoxical it sounds that 
language returns just immediately after it has been exiled 
foreveri In what sense is language required to constitute the 
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absolute ideal Objectivity of sense, of truth? Posing the 
question in the form of objectification, Husserl asks: 
How does lingual incarnation [Verleiblichung] make out 
of the merely intrasubjective formation the Objective, 
which, for example, as geometrical concept or state of 
affairs, is in fact present as understandable by all and 
is valic^, for all the future, already in its lingual 
expression as geometrical discourse, as geometrical 
proposition in its ideal geometrical sense? (OrG, Cr. 
AppVI P.358, Kr. p.369) 
Is it employed in the sense of the primary level of the lingual ideality o 
ty of a system of meanings? If so, is not the sense, the 
truth Husserl has endeavoured by all means to release from 
factuality, bounded again by some factual subjectivities, by a 
sensible spatiotemporality, by real history and culture? Does 
not the truth-sense then cease to be what it is? Even the 
language in general, which subsumes under its formality all 
actual and possible languages, i.e., systems of signification, 
cannot help obliterating the truth-sense, since, as the "pure 
grammar", the "a priori norms" of language, the language in 
general is, just as any factually actual or possible language, 
itself bounded by factual, empirical subjectivity and sensible 
spatiotemporali七y• 
§1. The Pure Possibility of Lingual Expressibility 
It is the pure ability of being lingually expressible, 
performed and achieved through the pure intentional lingual 
act, that constitutes the ideal Objectivity of the truth-sense 
out of a spiritual formation valid intra- and inter-psychical-
ly. We have a twofold iinplication concerning subjectivity and 
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language, articulated with the concept of sense. Firstly, the 
transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which keep 
hold of truth, sense and being, must perforin and achieve the 
accomplishments in and through an intentional act which syn-
thetically unified various distinguishable acts, one of which 
is necessarily the lingual act. The personal and communal 
psychical acts and their correlates, the intra- and inter-
psychically valid spiritual formations, are transformed into 
transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity and their 
correlate, the truth-sense, in and through the intentional act 
of pure speaking and writing. The transcendental subjectivity 
and intersubj ectivity, the most subjective of all subjectivi-
ties (since subjectivity as the principle of activity encoun-
ters no actual and possible factual resistance when it is 
transcendental) and the ideal truth-sense—being, the most 
objective of all objectivities (since objectivity as the princi-
ple of resistance stands fast before all actual and possible 
factual activities when it is ideal), are originated simultane-
ously and inseparably in one stroke in the pure act of language. 
The transcendental subjectivity is itself lingual in a pure 
sense. Secondly, concerning language, we are going to remark on 
the pure possibility of lingual incarnation and the pure lingual 
intention. The constituting language by means of which the ideal 
truth-sense is constituted is pure and transcendental. It must 
not be confused with any actual or possible factual language, nor 
even with language in general, which is nothing but the eidos of 
language arrived at after an eidetic reduction. All these belong 
to the constituted language which has no constitutive capacity in 
front of the sense-object• However, this way of formulation 
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might give the wrong impression that we have a transcendental 
language on one side, and empirical languages together with an 
eidetic language on the other. The truth is that the so-called 
constituting language is not a language at all but the pure 
possibility of expressibility in a de facto language, which is 
the proper item we should contrast to de facto languages and 
language in general. In addition, the constituting lingual 
intentional act must not be confused with the meaning-bestowing 
act and meaning-fulfilling act in the lived experience of an 
empirical language, which is aptly analyzed in the Logical 
Investiqations, though not to the last word. In the Investiga-
tions Husserl distinguishes between meaning and object, and 
contends that the meaning-bestowing act animates the vocal and 
graphic materials to make them the expression of an object, which 
is meant through the lingual meaning. The object must, of couirse, 
have its own sense, which, in turn, must be pre-lingual, pre-
predicative, since all lingual meaning-acts are claimed to be 
exhausted in meaning-intention and meaning—fulfillment• In the 
Ideas, the theme of this pre—predicative sense is first brought 
to the fore, and the predicative meaning only models itself after 
the pre—predicative sense. It follows that the meaning-bestowing 
act, rather than constituting its own sense, presupposes that the 
meaning and the sense of object have already been constituted. 
The constituting intentional act of pure lingual incarnation must 
be separated from the lived experience of a de facto language. 
Husserl asserts that the absolute ideal Objectivity of 
truth cannot be constituted without the pure possibility of a 
pure lingual incamatioru A spiritual formation would forever 
remain captive to the psychical life of a factual individual 
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subject if this pure possibility is not given. And, correla-
tively, every subjectivity would be bound forever to factuali— 
ty, dated with an empirical spatiotemporality, if the pure 
lingual intention does not break through the surface of psy-
chic acts. The problem is: how is the pure possibility of 
lingual incarnation given? How is the pure lingual intention 
given? It is, and must be, given together with a factual 
incarnation, together with a psychic act. It is from its very 
first legitimation permeated with factuality; or, more pre-
cisely, it is legitimated in its permeation with factuality. 
But one might suspect: is the factuality here the one we have 
reduced? Do we redescend towards the real language, the real 
culture, the real history, and the real time? Husserl writes 
that, through language, the sense receives its lingual flesh 
[Sprachleib]• The pure possibility of lingual incarnation 
[Verleiblichung] manifests itself originarily in the incarnation 
into the lingual flesh. Note that flesh and body, Leib and 
Korper, should not be confused with one and other, though they 
are intimately tied to each other.工 The pure possibility which 
constitutes the ideal Objectivity of sense, in its being and 
non-being, deals with Verleiblichung rather than Verkorperuna, 
It concerns the former de jure while is accompanied with the 
latter de facto. It follows that we do not reintroduce factuali-
ty, which is exclusively connected with Kdrper, although, with 
the Leib, a peculiar kind of human using of language in a pecul— 
1- Leib and Korper are concepts coining from the analysis of the 
intentionality of the body. Leib means the animate, living body 
which is the locus of intentionality in its kinesthetic function 
whereas Kdrper is the physical body, that is, body conceived as 
an empirical object. Husserl speaks of Sprachleib here to empha-
size the constituting function of language. 
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iar sense is involved in the constitution besides the pure possi-
bility made known above. In short, a train of thought makes us 
feel: the absolute ideal Objectivity is the pure possibility of 
lingual expressibility; the pure possibility is given de jure 
through the Sprachleib; The Sprachleib alludes to a lingual 
function more global than the pure possibility. 
§2. The Unity of Language, 
Human Existence and The World 
According to our previous consideration, it is necessary 
for us^to^^venture into the language which has already been work-
ing when the pure possibility of lingual expressibility, i.e., 
the constitution of sense is given. So we consider for a while 
how language is related to men and to the world. First we ana-
lyze the meanings of the world and fellow men which essentially 
interrelate with that language, then expose what the relation is. 
A. The world and human existence 
(i) The world as horizon 
( Living wakefully in the world we are constantly con-
scious of the world, whether we pay attention to it or 
not, conscious of it as the horizon of our life, as the 
horizon of •things丨（real Objects), of our actual and 
possible interests and activities (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.358, 
Kr. p.369). 
The thing, instead of being a stubborn something existing in 
itself, is only the unity of validity of all our actual and 
possible endeavors. The world, instead of being the total 
collection of all the things—in—themselves, is just the inter— 
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woven nexus "in" which all this is displayed (but without all 
this, there is no world)• However, we need some light upon 
the concept world-horizon. Is it universally valid? Or is it 
just valid in connection with factual community? We have the 
following texts at our disposal: 
[N]atural life can be characterised as a life naively, 
straightforwardly directed at the world, the world being 
always in a certain sense consciously present as a 
universal horizon.••• Waking life is always a directed— 
ness toward this or that, being directed toward it as an 
end or as means. . . . All this lies within the world-
horizon (PCH, Cr.AppI P.281, Kr p.327, my emphasis) 
Consciously we always live in the 1ifeworld• • • • 
Conscious of the world as a horizon, we live for 
our particular ends•••• In this case a self-en-
closed 'world‘-horizon is constituted. Thus as men 
a vocation we may permit ourselves to be indiffer-
ent to everything else, and we have an eye only for 
t h i s h o r i z o n as our w o r l d . ••• T h a t this w h o l e 
1 effective life and this whole work-world is held 
within the always obviously [selbstverstandiich] 
existing world in the most universal, full, life-
worldly [lebensweltlich] sense (Cr.AppVII p.379, Kr 
p.459, my emphasis). 
Nothing can be clearer than that in the cited texts: the world 
as "our" world is the universal horizon,- it is contrasted with 
the "work-world" of any factual individual and community,- and 
it is the world in the most universal, full, lifeworldly sense, 
which seems to be what Husserl calls surrounding world [Umwelt] 
or surrounding lifeworld [Lebensumwelt]. The first two points 
state that the world-horizon is universally valid while the third 
enjoys an ambiguity which may suggest adhesion to a factual 
community. 
Let us see if it is. A surrounding world refers to the his-
torico—cultural horizon of a particular community, the interwoven 
nexus of spiritual activities and endeavors in different levels 
as well as different dimensions, through which all the actuali-
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pie, the actuality, the validity-unit Apollo in the cultural-
historical life of the ancient Greek. All these endeavors and 
validities are deposited into a not fully determinate structure 
which invites new formations. Furthermore, all these activities 
gravitates towards and radiates from a responsible source of 
activities. We can see that each civilization [Menschheit] 
shapes its own surrounding world. The following testifies to our 
sayings: 
"Surrounding world" is a concept that has its place 
exclusively in the spiritual sphere. That we live in 
our particular surrounding world, which is the locus of 
all our cares and endeavors - this refers to a fact that 
occurs purely within the spiritual realm. Our surround-
ing world is a spiritual formation in us and in our 
historical life (PCH, Cr.AppI p.272, Kr p.317). 
The wa^ld:horizon is on the one hand universal whereas on the 
other hand it is cultural and spiritual. Then runs the fol-
lowing difficulty. The universal and the cultural characters 
of a world_horizon seem to be contradictory: universality 
implies detachment from any particular civilization, which in 
turn implies the abstraction of all cultural determination; 
culture implies attachment to a particular civilization, which 
in turn implies particularity. It seems that all we can talk 
about is either a universal world-horizon or a cultural world-
horizop but never a universal—cultural one. To this we reply 
that there exhibits a formal generality within all factually 
actual and possible surrounding worlds. It is to this formal 
generality that the universal world-horizon is attributed. 
And this formalization preserves the hoirizonal characters: all 
acquisition is deposited into an open whole which innovates 
new formations,- and every performance and achievement gravi-� 
tates towards and radiates from a responsible source. The 
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legitimacy of formalization can be testified in connections 
with culture: there is a "first originally form of cultures" 
(PCH, Cr.AppI P.281, Kr p.327, my emphasis), in contrast to any 
factual culture. It is beyond doubt that the culture and the 
history we are referring to here are not yet the culture of 
science and the history of truth. We have so far clarified the 
meaning of that world which essentially relates to language: the 
world is the indefinitely open, formal and universal horizon of 
possible human historico—cultural experiences and activities, and 
is anchored upon human existence. 
(ii) The human community as horizon 
^ then turn our gaze upon the human existence which is 
essentially related to language. One need not be surprised 
that the clarification is extremely straightforward, since it 
is formally the same with our preceding discussion. 
Always standing out against the world-horizon is the 
horizon of our fellow men [Mitmenschen], whether there 
are any of them present or not in each case "I" am 
conscious of them as "my" others, as those with whom I 
can enter into actual and potential, immediate and 
m e d i a t e r e l a t i o n s of e m p a t h y . . . . [E]very h u m a n 
being...has his fellow men [Mitmenschheit] and, always 
counting himself, civilization [Menschheit] in general, 
in which he knows himself to be living" (OrG, Cr.AppVI 
p.358, Kr. p.369). 
Similarly, we can ask whether the fellow mankind refers to 
only a universal community or just a factual community. Once 
again we find that the text suggests that it is at once uni-
versal and cultural; and the latter implies factual particu-
larity. Therefore we come upon a contradiction. Towards the 
resolution, we have no need to anticipate anything new. The 
Menschheit in question is "a certain norm-style of human exist-
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ence (speaking in formal generality)” which "signifies a first 
historicity within which particular factual norm-styles of cul-
ture—creating existence remain formally the same" (PCH Cr.AppI 
P.281, Kr. p. 326) . That is, the fellow community we are speaking 
of is the formal and universal structure which reserves all 
actual way of communication into a world from which new ones 
spring. And this historico-communal life first radiates from 
and gravitated towards the "I", the "we". 
(iii) The relation between the world 
and human existence 
Going through the preceding twofold clarification, we can 
see this without any difficulty: the world is always the human 
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world, and ultimately, our world; and, the horizon of our 
fellow men always stands out against the world-horizon. The 
world as horizon displays an openness and a centredness; and 
the "we" here and now is the centre of radiation and gravitation. 
The relation between the world-horizon and the lifeworld [Leben-
swelt], and, correlatively, that between the "I" and "we" spoken 
of here and the transcendental accomplishing subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity which constitute the lifeworld, will not be 
inquired into in our present study.^ < � 
B. The common language 
(i) The human community as lingual horizon 
1. Thus we have three worlds the surrounding world which is 
cultured in full sense, the world-horizon which is universally 
cultural and the lifeworld which is the "realm of original evi-
dences [Evidenzen]," the universe of "what is intuitable in 
principle", of what is actually experienceable" (Cr. Pt.IIIA, 
§34d, p. 127, Kr. p. 130)• 
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The language which is already at work at the moment the 
ideal truth-sense is constituted, is exclusively interwoven 
with the fellow mankind and the world horizoru 
It .is precisely to this horizon of civilization [Mensch-
heitshorizont] that common language belongs. One is 
conscious of civilization from the start as an immediate 
and mediate lingual community. Clearly it is only 
through language and its far-reaching documentations, as 
possible communication, that the horizon of civilization 
can be open and endless one, as it always is for men. • • • 
civilisation is, for every man whose we—horizon it is, a 
community of those who can reciprocally express them-
selves, normally, in a fully understandable fashion 
(OrG, Cr.AppVI p.358-9, Kr. p.369) 
Now Husserl gives us a big bill: the human community is a 
lingual community. Two important aspects can be extracted 
from it. The first concerns the human community. With the 
assertion^that the human community is lingual, it follows that 
all the work we have attributed to it in the above section is 
thoroughly accomplished through the medium of language. The 
second concerns the language. We should bear in mind that the 
human community being discussed here is never this or that de 
facto community but the formal mankind-horizon, which, as 
horizon, is nevertheless stamped with the "we" here and now as 
its centre of radiation and gravitation. Accordingly, the 
language we are attempting to clarify here is first of all the 
common language which is not this or that de facto language 
but is formal and universal. Besides, since the human communi-
ty is lingual, the common language must be a horizon, which 
nevertheless accords a primacy to the "our" present, here and 
now speaking and writing. In short the common language is 
itself a horizon. Hence, taking the two aspects synthetical-
ly ^  we can see that the common language-horizon and the human 
community are interrelated possibilities in such a way that 
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the common language articulates the human communal acts where-
as the community-horizon permeates the lingual acts. The 
relation between the language-horizon and community-horizon is 
identical with that between the community—horizon and the 
world-horizon: the language-horizon always stands out against 
the community-horizon. We have concretely exhibited what the 
common language is and what the relation between it and the 
community-horizon is and the latter has also received its con-
crete determination in the course. 
(ii) The world as lingual horizon 
After the clarification of the common language and its 
relatipn _to the human community, the relation between the 
common language and the world-horizon can easily be discerned, 
since it is already hidden there. 
[W]ithin this [the lingual] community everyone can talk 
about what is within the surrounding world of his civi-
lization [Menschheit] as Objectively existing. Every-
thing has its name, or is namable in the broadest sense, 
i.e., lingually expressible. The Objective world is 
from the start the world for all, the world which 
"everyone" has as world-horizon. Its Objective being 
presupposes men, understood as men with a common lan-
guage (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.359, Kr. p.369-370). 
The world-horizon, as "our" horizon, is the open and endless 
field of "our" communal acts, and it stretches itself through 
and through in these acts. Correlative to these communal acts 
are the ways of dealing with things, or objects, each of which 
is nothing but a unity of validities of dealings. Therefore, 
as the community horizon, the world—horizon is itself articu— 
lated through the common language. By means of this common 
language, we deal with objects, i.e., the objects manifest 
themselves, institute themselves as unities of validities, in 
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different ways. Therefore, the things, the objects, as unities 
of validities, are and, indeed, must be lingually expressible. 
(iii) Further clarification 
It cannot be overemphasized that what Husserl ventures 
into are the de jure conditions which a priori generate truth, 
science but never the de facto factors which accompany the 
generation. "Our" language, "our" fellow community, "our" 
world "here" and "now" - all these signify prescientific 
constituting functions with respect to science, to truth. 
They should never be confused with anything the very existence 
of which necessarily presupposes that sense and truth have 
already constituted. Therefore, they are not any real lan-
guage, real fellow community, real world, all of which are 
always only variable examples. They are not even the eidos 
language, the eidos fellow community, the eidos world which, 
being brought into light through the eidetic reduction, deal 
with sense and truth as ready made. We thus find ourselves 
disagreeing with Derrida丨s exposition of Husserl on the pre— 
scientific constituting function of language, men and world. 
The common language is conceived as, or at least supposes, the 
eidos J.anguage. There we read: "The possibility of a mediate 
and immediate horizon of universal language first supposes 
that the hazardous problem concerning the possibility of a 
"pure g r a m m a r " and "a p r i o r i n o r m s " of l a n g u a g e is 
r e s o l v e d … " ( I n t r o , p. 80) . The world-horizon and the we-
consciousness are conceived as a "precultural pure Nature" 
(Intro, p.81) and the consciousness of facing a same thing 
with others: “ [Two men] can always, immediately or not, stand 
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together before the same natural existent - which we can 
always strip of the cultural superstructures and categories 
founded on it.•• Consciousness of confronting the same thing, 
an object perceived as such, is consciousness of a pure and 
precultural we...This purely natural objective existent is the 
existing sensible world.. . “ (Intro, p.81). Firstly, the pure 
grammar is the system of a priori norms which every language 
must obey so long as it is a system of signs expressing ready 
made sense and meaning. But the common language-horizon is 
not language in a full sense but the a priori genesis of sense 
and meaning. These two terms belong to two different levels 
of theorization. Secondly, although sense and being, for 
Husseri (at least after the Ideas), are generally determined 
as object or objectivity, the consciousness and the object are 
never self—contained but are horizon—consciousness and object— 
in-horizon respectively. And the horizon we are speaking of 
is the a priori conditions of culture, so it is cultural 
though every cultural factuality is suspended. Therefore, the 
"same thing" cannot be "an object perceived as such", a 
"purely natural objective existent"; the world-horizon cannot 
be "the existing sensible world". 
Going through the above itinerary, I think it is suffi-
ciently clear in what sense Husserl is talking about the 
original language, fellow men and world from which sense and 
truth originate. We end this section with Husserl ‘ s own 
words: 
Language, for its part, as function and exercised capac-
ity, is related correlatively to the world, the universe 
of Objects which is lingually expressible in its being 
and being-such. Thus men as men, fellow men, world -
the world of which men, of which we, always talk and can 
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talk 一 and, on the other hand, language, are inseparably 
intertwined； and one is always certain of their insepa-
rable relational unity, though usually only implicitly, 
in the manner of a horizon (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.359, Kr. 
p.370). 
§3. The Objectification of Sense 
The possibility of language as function and capacity is 
presupposed. Then, we turn back to the question: how can an 
immediate something occurred in the stream of consciousness in 
its first production be eventually objectified to be an ideal 
Objectivity? The process is, according to Husserl, accom-
plished in three stages: first, the identity of the spiritual 
formation within psychical egological sub j ectivity second, 
the identity of the formation in psychical intersubjectivity 
finally the identity of the absolute ideal Objectivity. Only 
in the second and third stage is language required. Note that 
the so called "process" and "stage" do not refer to a real 
process or real stages but the sense-genesis. The primal 
instituting geometer may at the very first moment in a single 
stroke institute the sense and, correlatively, attain the 
level of transcendental subjectivity, without going separately 
through the real stages. 
A. The living present and psychical validity 
The first stage, i.e., the production of the evidence 
[Evidenz] of the identity of a spiritual formation, is itself 
accomplished in two steps: first the identity out of a present 
flow of time-consciousness and second the one out of any actual 
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and possible flow.^ The original being—itself—there in the 
original evidence, though being actually accomplished with psy-
chical immanent acts and their act-contents, is anything but 
psychical immanent content, not to speak of the transcendent acts 
and contents, i.e., acts and contents themselves being treated as 
real things； and it should not be dated with the sensible, world-
ly time. The original being—itself—there is a synthetic unity 
accomplished in the living present[lebendige Gegenwart] , which is 
a slice or a segment of the absolute flow of time-consciousness, 
in its work of unifying the retention, the pretention and the 
primal impression, which retains the just—elapsed phase, antici-
pates the soon-coming phase, and enjoys the now-phase of the 
immanent acts and contents respectively. Thanks to the whole 
complicated operation, we can be conscious of, for example, a 
sound throughout its actual on-going in a present flow of time. 
So the original being-itself-there can be identified throughout a 
set of present psychic acts. Now the original evidence in the 
1. Husserl lectured on the constitution of time in 1904-05 and 
left us a bulk of manuscripts dated from 1901 to 1911. Now they 
have appeared in book-form: Zur Phanomenoloqie des inneren Zeit-
bewu/3tseins, ed. R. Boehm, Husserliana Band X (The Hague: Marti-
mis Nijhoff, 1966) • It includes the whole set of an earlier edition: 
Vorlesunaen zur Phanomenoloqie des inneren Zeitbewu/3tseins, ed. M. 
Heidegger (Halle: Niemeyer, 1928) , which contains the entire lecture 
notes and several manuscripts from 1905-11. We have an English 
translation of Heidegger,s edition only: The Phenomenology of Inter-
nal Time Consciousness, tr. J. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1964) • Husserl worked on the concept of the living 
present extensively in 1928—1933 (directly before the "Crisis peri— 
od) and left us another bulk of manuscript which is preserved in the 
Husserl Archive in Louvain coded as the C一manuscripts • Fine studies 
of Husserl ‘ s theory of time in English are (1) John Borough, "The 
Emergence of an Absolute Conscious in Husserl ‘ s early Writings on 
Time-Consciuosness", Man and World, vol. V, 1972, reprinted in 
Husserl; Expositions and ADioraisals. Ed. & intro. F.A. Elliston & P. 
McCormick (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press) 
and (2) Robert Solowski, Husserlian Meditations (Evanston: North-
western University Press, 1974), §§52—53, ch. 5 and ch.6, pp. 132 — 168. 
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first production may gradually fade away and disappear. But 
there is always the possibility of recollection. At first the 
once lived—experience [Erlebnis] and its experienced content is 
awakened obscurely, and then it can always be recollected in a 
present Erlebnis which lives through the past Erlebnis with the 
consciousness of its being once the case. That is, an evident 
consciousness of coincidence is brought forth which identifies 
the originally evident formation and the present one. Further-
more, we establish in this recollection the evident consciousness 
of the identity of the formation in any actual and possible 
repetition. Therefore, the original being—itself-there can be 
identified throughout the whole psychic life of an individual. 
That is, an identity of the spiritual formation is attained 
within the psychical egological subjectivity•1 But "we have 
still not gone beyond the subject and his subjective, evident 
capacities; that is, we still have no 'Objectivity' given" (OrG, 
Cr. AppVI p.360, Kr. p.370). 
B. Speech and interpsychical validity 
It is the activity of speech, the direct, present, oral 
communication, that sets free the spiritual formation from the 
prison^of the egological subject. By means of speech, differ-
ent subjects can come to reciprocal understanding, and hence 
"the original production and the product of one subj ect can be 
1. Before the "Crisis" period, what the living—present has accom-
plished attains transcendental validity. Whilst here, it accomplishes 
only something psychically valid. The mere form of primordial tempo-
ralization does not as it once did suffice to guarantee transcenden-
tal validity. Only a primordial temporalization of lingual material 
pervaded with lingual intention does suffice. The concept of the 
transcendental undergoes a profound change. 
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actively understood by the others" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.360, Kr. 
p. 371). Similar to the case of recollection, the full under-
standing of other‘s production and product means nothing but a 
present Erlebnis which lives through again on other‘s Erleb-
nis. The product is reproduced with the evidence of being 
identical. In this way an identity of a spiritual formation 
is attained within the immediate speaking community. Never-
theless, the spiritual formation has not yet been fully con-
stituted as ideal Objectivity. It is so tied to the factual 
communal subjectivity that it has no "persisting existence", 
no "continuing-to—be". It no longer endures when "the inven— 
tor are no longer wakefully so related or even are no longer 
alivel!^ Itwhen no one has actualized it in evidence" (OrG, 
Cr.AppVI P.360, Kr. p.371). 
C. Writing and absolute validity 
The remaining task is waiting for writing to accomplish. 
"The important function of written, documenting lingual ex-
pression is that it makes communication possible without 
immediate or mediate address; it is, so to speak, communica-
tion become virtual" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.360-1, Kr. p.371). The 
possibility of writing detaches every possible attachment of a 
sense-formation to any factual individual subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity. That is, sense is no longer restricted to 
the factual evident consciousness of a psychic subject and the 
communal consciousness of the community in actual communica-
tion. Writing sets sense free from factual subjectivity. 
However, this by no means implies that sense is free from all 
subjectivity, quite the contrary, the disconnection of sense 
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from factual subjectivity shows only that sense is constituted 
in as transcendental subjectivity, and is spread and handed 
down in a transcendental community through transcendental 
historical communication. And the transcendental subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity manifest oricfinaliter in the pure inten-
tion of writing (which produces the sense) and the pure inten-
tion of reading (which reproduces the sense)• Hence, the 
absolute ideal Objectivity of sense is constituted, and is 
constituted in its possibility of being written, being incar-
nated into a lingual flesh. The pure intentional act of 
writing is the ultimate condition of the constitution of sense 
and truth. 
Wifiting occasions the hand-in-hand birth of the absolute 
subjectivity and the absolute objectivity through constituting 
the ideal truth-sense. More precisely, it is the couple pure 
intention of writing and pure ability of being written that do 
the work. As we have already pointed out earlier in this 
chapter, the pure possibility of writing, in both sense of 
being the pure intention and the pure ability, juridically 
necessarily originates together with the incarnation into a 
lingual flesh. Whereas a flesh is factually necessarily given 
together with a body. A flesh is an animate body while a body 
is an unanimated flesh; the former expresses intentions and 
meanings while the latter indicates them. The constituting 
function of language thus maintains a de jure necessarily 
relation with the lingual flesh but a de facto necessarily one 
with the lingual body. This double characteristic of language 
gives us two directionally reversal paradoxes. The first is 
the one that we have so far talked about in connection with 
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the lingual flesh: because of the possibility of expressible 
in language, a sense is free from all language; because of the 
possibility of being tied to factuality, a sense is free from 
factuality; because of the possibility of being bound to 
sensible spatiotemporality, a sense is free from sensible 
spatiotemporality; in short, because of the possibility of 
being not itself, of non-being, a sense is itself. Now to 
these we can always supplement with the reverse paradox in 
connection with the lingual body: because of being free from 
all language, a sense is expressible in language; because of 
being free from factuality, a sense is possibly tied to factu-
ality; because of its being free from sensible spatiotempo-
raltiy^ a ..sense is possibly bound to sensible spatiotemporali-
ty; in short, because of being itself, a sense is possibly not 
itself. The global phenomenon language at once engenders and 




THE HOW OF TRADITION: 
SEDIMENTATION，REACTIVATION 
AND UNIVOCITY 
Our (and Husserl•s) inquiry into the possibility of a 
pure history so far have laid bare the condition for the 
original genesis of sense, and here comes the turn to throw 
light on the conditions for the transmission and the develop-
ment of the sense, i.e., the reproduction of sense and the 
production of a new one out of those already valid. 
Let us start with a precaution. We have just been talk-
ing as though an original sense has already been constituted 
by an instituting thinker, and the problem is how the inheri— 
tor of the sense can reproduce it and produce something new 
out of it. Do not those lingual gestures such as "already", 
"has been", "re"-produce and "new" suppose that the whole 
matter is conducted within the worldly or cosmic time? But 
have we not so patiently shown that the ideal truth-sense is 
supratWporal with respect to the sensible temporality and 
that it is omnitemporal? The genesis and the development of 
sense themselves display a historical time; they have their 
historical temporality, or, their historicity. Under no 
circumstances should the phenoinenological historical time be 
confused with the mundane time. 
However, unfortunately or not, we could proceed only with 
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our natural language, which remains blind and deaf to the dis— 
tinction between transcendentality and mundane-ness. We 
always strive for the transcendental by means of the mun-
dane. Husserl has very early in his transcendental vocation 
pointed out that a "definitive fixation of scientific lan-
guage" and a "complete analysis of phenomena" require each 
other, that "it is rooted in the nature of things" .1 Thus 
we transform our language in and through our transcendental 
inquiry at the same time. So while one is advised not to 
stick to those above words in their mundane senses, yet one 
also cannot, and should not, abandon them at all. 
1 §1. The Dialectic of Origin and Tradition 
The condition for the original genesis of sense is lan-
guage, which is both Leib and Korper and which at the same 
time engenders and endangers the truth-sense. It seems that 
the question of the possibility of reproduction of sense is 
not so urgent as that of the possibility of securing it from 
some misery which may be resulted from its inborn danger. 
What kind of terrible misery can an absolute ideal Objectiv-
ity suffer from? A sensible object, say, a lion of flesh 
1.Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" in Phenomenoloav and 
the Crisis of Philosophy (cf. n.2, Introduction) , pp. 96. Eugen Fink 
has underlined the point in his article in Kantstudien, 1933 , "The 
Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary 
Criticism" in The Phenomenology of Husserl; Selected Critical Read-
ings, ed. & tr. w/ intro. R.O. Elveton (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1970), pp. 143-144 . The phenomenological reduction cannot be under-
stood by a simple employment of language of the natural attitude but 
by a transformation of the natural language. 
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and blood, may perish, i.e., its being may be totally anni— 
hilated. What about ideal objects? Being idealities, they 
are, of course, in some sense, once and for all and for 
everyone. However, as we have shown, there are bound ideali-
ties , w h i c h necessarily adhere to factuality. The word 
"Lowe" itself, its very being, would have never been, if the 
actual and possible existence of German language and German 
speaking community is not given. The unity of meaning Lowe, 
similarly, would have never been, if the actual and possible 
existence of empirical subjectivity is not given. Only the 
absolute ideal Obj ectivity seems to be immune from any 
obliteration of being. Still, since the ideal truth-sense 
is instituted in language, does not a worldly catastrophe of 
written documents and vocal records or a massacre of all the 
people who are able to speak out and write down the sense 
destruct the sense? Yes, if destruction means that there is 
no longer a factual lingual subj ect who can lingually ex-
press the sense, there is not any p h o n e t i c and graphic 
materialization of the sense. Yet, the sense remains stub-
bornly the same in its being. No factuality can demolish 
the absolute ideal Objectivity. 
In what sense can we then seriously speak of the obliter-
ation ^of an ideal sense? In its very first constitution in 
the living present of the transcendental ego, which syntheti-
cally unifies all the different acts involved, we have no 
sense to speak of an obliteration of the sense, although an 
inborn danger is made known. However, if the first original 
acts of the instituting living present are not retained in 
another living present, be it another present of the same 
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psychic subject or a present of another psychic subject, the 
original living present and the sense it constitutes are in a 
peculiar sense obliterated. (The word "obliteration" itself is 
being obliterated.) We cannot say that the sense is obliter— 
ated since it is once created in a past absolute origin. 
Nevertheless, we cannot say that the sense is not obliterated 
since the present absolute origin has no memory of the past 
absolute origin, that is, the past is no longer the past of 
the present. It is no longer itself, it is nothing. The 
sense is endangered in its being in a present forgetting of 
it, i.e., a present inability to relive it. The possibility 
of reliving the sense is inseparable from the possibility of 
securing it. The possibility of reproduction of the sense is 
inseparable from the possibility of production of it. Accord-
ingly, the production, the securing and the reproduction are 
not so discrete as one may first be tempted to think. The 
problem of the constitution of sense is being continued in the 
problem of its tradition. 
§2. Sedimentation and Reactivation 
( V 
A. The Original Mode of Language 
We have observed that sense is constituted in a Verlei-
blichung of a pure writing intention, and a Verleiblichung 
is always accompanied with a Verkorperung. The sense runs 
its risk exactly when the qeistiae Leiblichkeit is complete-
ly downgraded to the K6rperlichkeit• The flesh is totally 
taken to be the body. On the other way round, a present 
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inheritor secures the sense just in preserving the Geistiq-
keit of the Leib. The sense at the very first moment of its 
constitution is factually tied to a factual language in a 
necessary manner. The pure intention of writing is made 
known to itself in a factual w r i t i n g - d o w n in a factual 
language. The original constituting act may fade out gradu-
ally but the written sign still exists. (1) A reader of the 
lingual sign, as a lingual being with a common language— 
horizon with the first institutor, can u n d e r s t a n d the 
sense-formation fully, i.e., can reactivate the original 
sense of the acts in original evidence: "this is the capaci— 
ty for reactivation that belongs originally to every human 
being—,as ‘.a speaking being" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.361,Kr p. 371). 
(2) The sense, being produced when it is incarnated and 
embodied, is from now on stamped with the lingual sign. An 
upsurge of sense is simultaneously a return to sign. A 
sense-formation necessarily arises from the already sedimen-
tary sense-formations and falls back to the sedimentary 
soil. Every single dealing with it is mediated with the 
sign. The constitution is accordingly a sedimentation: 
"[T]he writing—down effects a transformation of the original 
mode of being of the sense-formation... It becomes sedi-
mented, so to speak" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.361,Kr. p.371-2). (3) 
Langual signs, being the flesh and the body of a primordial 
act, are thus nothing but an abstract aspect of the concrete 
constitution of sense: "[S]entences give t h e m s e l v e s in 
consciousness as reproductive transformations of an original 
sense produced out of an actual, original activity; that is, 
in themselves they refer to such a genesis" (OrG, Cr.AppVI 
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p.365,Kr. p.374-5). Thus, after the notions of reactivation 
and sedimentation are introduced, how language as the condi-
tion for the origin and the tradition of sense fulfills its 
vocation can be determined concretely.工 
B. Two Derivative Mode of Language 
Instead of exploring immediately the conceptual richness 
reactivation and sedimentation bring in, we first point out 
two other possible ways in which language functions as Husserl 
conceives, the first of which has already been brought in 
tacitly. 
1 . (i) Passivity 
Langual signs awaken their familiar meanings. "The 
awakening is something passive,* the awakened meaning is thus 
given passively•••"(OrG, Cr.AppVI p.361,Kr p.371). One could 
think "in terms of things that have been taken up merely 
receptively, passively, which deals with meanings only pas-
sively understood and taken o v e r … • P a s s i v i t y in general is 
the realm of things that are bound together and melt into one 
another associatively, where all sense that arises is put 
together passively"(OrG, Cr.App p.361,Kr p.372). The sign as 
that which anchors the sedimentation must not be mistaken as 
either a sensible-experienceable thing or a lingual ideality. 
As a lingual sign for a speaking subject, it can and must 
l.We can see in advance that with the introduction of sedimentation and 
reactivation, the primordial temporalization operates on the histor-
ical plane to contribute to the genesis of ideal Objectivity. It is 
only the transcendental historical subjectivity that is responsible 
for the ideal Objectivity. 
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arouse meaning in the latter‘s consciousness. It is precisely 
because of this function that the sign is a sediment of spir— 
itual products. The awakening is "passive" and the awakened 
meaning is "passively" given. The speaking subject simply 
receives something. The meanings are so vague and undifferen-
tiated that they fluctuate and flow into each other. Having 
received these sedimented meanings, a kind of thinking activi-
ty is possible which manipulates them by association. One 
receives the sedimented meanings passively, and then manipu-
lates them associatively. The speaking subject abdicates his 
responsibility for the reactivation of the original sense. At 
one go, the sense is obliterated and the subject slips into an 
unauthentic life. At this point, one might accuse the sign 
of its concealment of sense and might think of getting rid 
of the sedimented meaning forever from the sign. But the 
concealment of sense or the connection with sedimented 
meaning is first of all the very condition for the being of 
the sign, for its being a "reproductive transformation" of 
an original sense and for its referring to an original 
genesis. It is also the necessary mode of being of the 
sense if the sense is originally produced in original activ-
ities . W i t h o u t the passive awakening and the awakened 
meaning, the sign will not be able to allude to an original 
• 
sense-genesis, and the sense is unable to be generated and 
advanced in a tradition. That is, both sign and sense will 
be nothing without the passivity• 
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(ii) Logicality 
A peculiar activity called "explication" [Verdeutlichung] 
is always possible if the speaking subject has passively 
received a sedimented meaning in associative understanding. 
The vague and undifferentiated meaning can be "actively expli-
cated. “ Explication "articulates what has been read...ex-
tracting one by one...the elements of sense, thus bringing the 
total validity to active performance...on the basis of indi-
vidual validities" (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.364,Kr. p.374). We can 
see that the activity of explication never transforms a sedi— 
merited meaning back to its origirw more radically, it never 
treats the passively awakening meaning as a sediment, as 
somethj-ng, which refers to an original genesis. This sort of 
activity simply takes a passive, receptive meaning as a matter 
of course, and it proceeds to bring in clarity and distinction 
out of the vague and undifferentiated meaning. Anyway, the 
meaning constructed in explication "is in the mode of having 
been originally produced....The explicated judgment becomes 
an ideal o b j e c t i v i t y c a p a b l e of b e i n g p a s s e d on" (OrG, 
Cr.AppVI p.364,Kr. p.374). That is, the activity of expli-
cation has its own sort of evidence and the produced mean-
ing—validity can always be brought back with an evident 
consciousness of being identically the same. Furthermore, 
this sort of activity makes possible "evident constructions 
of new judgments on the basis of those already valid for us" 
(OrG, Cr.AppVI p.364, Kr. p.374). The whole of this kind of 
activity, the kind of e v i d e n c e it b r i n g s forth and the 
itieaning—validity produced are branded the "domain of logic" 
(OrG, Cr.AppVI P.364, Kr. p.374). Explication is the logi-
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cal activity; the evidence of explication is the logical 
evidence; the explicated meaning is the logical meaning, the 
proposition or the judgment. The sign has no constitutive 
role to play in the realm of prepositional meanings. 
C. Implications 
Having pointed out these two possibilities besides the 
original function of language four interrelated points can be 
derived. (1) The original performance and reactivation are 
neither the passive understanding nor the active logical 
thinking. (2) The original evidence is not the logical evi-
dence. (3) The sense is neither* the sedimented meaning nor 
the p[^positional meaning. The propositional meaning cease-
lessly presupposes and yet always forgets the original truth-
sense. The propositional meaning is an ideal objectivity, and 
accordingly, is identical in itself and supratemporal. But 
these simply are not that of the ideal truth-sense. Then, if 
the sense is not the "objective", logical meaning, is it the 
subjective disposition affected by the objective? In ordinary 
discourse, one speaks of the propositional meaning of, e.g., 
geometry on the one hand and the meaning or the value of 
geometry for human life on the other hand. But the case is 
that both the so-called "objective" meaning and the "subjec-
tive" value are possible only after the ideal truth-sense has 
once been generated no matter it is forgotten or not. The 
sense is constituted before the fact and the value can be 
distinguished,- the sense itself makes the distinction. (4) 
the sign in its primordial happening is not a propositional 
sign. The primordial sign is neither the expression nor the 
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indication in the Logical Investiqations• The former express-
es a meaning in its being animated by an expressive act where-
as the latter indicates a meaning by an indicative act. 
However, the meaning they serve as a sign to mean and to label 
respectively is an already constituted, i.e., a logical prepo-
sitional meaning. The primordial sign is the sedimentation of 
an original sense. 
Now we can ask and answer for ourselves the question: How 
does a tradition of sense work? That is, how is a sense 
propagated and how is a new sense developed? The sense is 
always sedimented in signs. Each passive meaning and each 
logic.^1 meaning signifies a sense. Each advance of passive 
meaning or logical meaning signifies an advent of sense. A 
sense is reproduced if there is a present reactivation of the 
sedimented sign back to the original acts. And a new sense is 
produced if a new meaning is produced in the first place 
associatively or evidently in the passive or the logical 
sphere respectively, and then the associative or the evident 
production is reactivated back to the advent of sense. A pure 
tradition of truth-sense, as a lively advancing movement of 
sense,• is thus nothing but the interpenetration and interen-
velopment of original genesis, sedimentation and reactivation. 
But, at the same time, the phenomenon of "crisis" is made 
possible 一 the forgetting of the origin, i.e., a total surren-
der to passivity or logicality. 
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§3. Univocity 
A. Univocity as the ultimate condition 
of sedimentation and reactivation 
We now proceed to answer the question: What is the condi-
tion for a pure tradition? As we have shown, a pure tradition 
of ideal truth-sense is a intertwining advancing movement of 
sedimentation and reactivation. Thus, the condition for a 
pure tradition is that of sedimentation and reactivation. It 
takes no difficulty to see that sedimentation and reactiva-
tion are interrelated possibilities: (1) If a sense-forma-
tion can be sedimented in signs, then an ideal sense is 
constituted, and so it is valid for "everyone" lived in the 
tradition, i.e., it is reactivable. (2) If an original 
sense is reactivable , it is identically repeatable for 
"everyone", then it must be expressible in signs, i.e., it 
can be sedimented. Therefore sedimentation and reactivation 
share the same concrete condition of possibility. Language, 
as we have already analyzed, is the condition for sedimenta-
tion; and so is it for reactivation. That is, language is 
the condition for a pure tradition, a pure history. The 
word "language" refers to the global phenomenon of language 
in which the common language-horizon, the community—horizon 
and the world-horizon articulate against each other. Every-
thing is lingually expressible and everyone can reciprocally 
express himself in a fully understandable fashion. But here 
a more concrete determination is brought forth: 
[Reactivability] occurs when one has a view to the 
univocity of lingual expression and to securing, by 
means of the most painstaking coining of the rele-
vant words, propositions, and complexes of proposi-
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tions, the results which are to be u n i v o c a l l y 
expressed (OrG, Cr.AppVI p.362,Kr. p.372, my empha-
sis) . 
To secure the results means to constitute the sense, i.e., to 
make it a sediment. Thus the condition for tradition and 
history is more specifically determined as the univocity of 
language. 
Obviously, univocity belongs to the side of the common 
language-horizon whereas equivocity marks every natural lan-
guage. By means of univocity, a sense-formation is able to 
deposit itself in a univocal expression and hence can be 
reactivated; that is, an ideal truth-sense is generated. Fur-
thermore, guided by univocal expression, the interplay of 
sedimentation and reactivation always signifies the incessant 
advent of sense. If a science is to preserve its genuine, 
original sense, then 
the method of producing original idealities out of 
what is prescientifically given in the cultural world 
must have been written down and fixed in firm sen-
tences. ..furthermore, the capacity for translating 
these sentences from vague lingual understanding into 
the clarity of the reactivation of their evident 
sense must have been, in its own way, handed down and 
ever capable of being handed down (OrG, Cr.AppVI 
p.366,Kr. p.375-6, my emphasis). 
It is in this way that univocal language is the ultimate 
possibility of the institution of sciences and of philosophy 
as a universal science, both of which strive for the absolute 
and objective truth. Univocity makes possible the scientific 
culture and the interior history, pure history. Whereas 
equivocal natural language is essentially tied to the presci-
entific and extrascientific life in which relative and subjec-
tive knowledge and actuality for our particular purpose and 
care are circulated. Equivocity is always the brand of factu-
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al culture and exterior history, empirical history. 
B. Univocity as telos 
But, now, what is the univocal language itself? If it is 
not secured, all we have said will run the risk of being word-
play. On the one hand, univocity seems to be sufficiently 
guaranteed by the common language-horizon. On the other hand, 
it seems that only if a language in full sense is at disposal, 
can an original sense be instituted. Is the univocal language 
formal and universal? Or is it a language in full sense? We 
have a dilemma. If it is a formal and universal structure, it 
has no constituting capacity. If it is a language in full 
sense, it is nothing but a natural language. And a natural 
language is a mobile and open complex of relations and con-
trasts, in which a word can be placed in ever new and unfore-
seeable articulations. It means 七 h a t a language in full sense 
is an equivocal language, and therefore adulterates the pure 
history. 
Everywhere it seems that we have empirical cultures on 
the one hand and the formal conditions for possibility on the 
other. The univocal language which is supposed to juridically 
generate pure sense in a concrete manner 一 what is it? Here 
Husserl makes a decisive resolution tacitly which is acutely 
pointed out by Derrida: 
Absolute univocity is inaccessible, but only as an 
Idea in the Kantian sense can be.•.Univocity is also 
the absolute horizon of equivocity•••univocity is 
both the apriori and teleological condition of all 
historicity; it is that without which the very equiv-
ocations of empirical culture and history would not 
be possible (Intro, p.104-5). 
The univocal language is neither factual language nor formal 
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condition. It is the common language-horizon we have already 
explored. This common language-horizon is now determined as a 
teleological horizon: it is a telos at infinity which makes 
possible all factual language and towards which all factual 
language tends. It follows that the pure culture and history 
are also an infinite telos which makes possible all factual 
culture and history and to which they advance. 
Now what consequences can we derive, if the univocal 
language is an infinite telos which poses an infinite task 
upon every language? (1) Since sedimentation functions exclu-
sively within equivocal language, reactivation can never be 
complete and genuine in full originality. Every reactivation 
is guided by the genuine reactivation as an infinite telos. 
(2) E^en the genuine sedimentation itself is an infinite telos 
guiding all factual sedimentation which is necessarily pollut-
ed by equivocity. (3) The original sense is accordingly 
itself an infinite telos since its constitution, i.e., its 
sedimentation and reactivation, is posed as an infinite task. 
The origin is the telos. (4) Man himself is idealized: our 
finite capacity to reactivate is posed within the infinite 
telos of reactivation. Mankind having infinite task is him-
self situated in an infinite horizon. Here is an infinitiza-
tion of men: mankind with infinite task is itself an infi-




HISTORY AS THE ALL-ENCOMPASSING 
ULTIMATE HORIZON 
In the previous discussion, we have attempted to eluci-
date the apriori and yet concrete conditions of absolute 
Objectivity. They are determined as language, writing, 
sedimentation and reactivation, and finally univocity. And 
correlatively, the pure intentional history has received a 
thein^ic_ treatment to a certain extent. It signifies an 
advent of sense rather than a concatenation of facts. So 
far we have concentrated all of our energy on the transcen-
dental history and its concrete possibilities. However, 
what does history mean to our human existence in the world 
as a whole? Specifically, having been contrasted with each 
other, how do the pure history of sense and the empirical 
history of facts relate more d e t e r m i n a t e l y ? Generally 
asking, how does the pure history relate to other human 
experiences and activities? 
§1. The Historical Present 
We, human beings, always live at the present in the 
three- in-one but one-as-three horizon -- the common language, 
the humankind [Menschheit] and the surrounding lifeworld as 
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the one prescientific cultural world. Each of them articulates 
against one another. To all this we have already thrown light 
on, Husserl at this moment of inquiry enriches with the fol-
lowing determination: 
We are constantly, vitally conscious of this horizon, 
and specifically as a temporal horizon implied in our 
given present horizon.•••[The world-horizon], for 
every historical time and civilization[Menschheit], 
has its particular features and is precisely the 
tradition. We stand, then, within the historical 
horizon in which everything is historical(OrG, Cr. 
AppVI p.369, Kr. p.378, my emphasis). 
All past human experiences and endeavours, accomplishments and 
achievements, are not facts scattered over the mundane time 
which is linear and homogeneous, but are rather sense-forma-
tions dwelling in the phenoinenological time which is always 
totalTy converged to and lived in the present. In regard to 
the case that these human perfoirmance and achievement aire 
precisely spiritual and cultural, the non—linear, heterogene-
ous phenoinenological time in which they dwell cannot be more 
suitably called historical. Thus, the horizon of the common 
language, of the one mankind, of the one surrounding lifeworld 
is temporalized, or more precisely, historicized. Human being 
as lingual being, communal being and being-in-the-world-hori-
zon is a temporal, or historical, being. In view of the fact 
that the human living in the surrounding lifeworld is charac-
terized as the fundamental mode of human existence, that the 
surrounding lifeworld is the nourishing soil [Boden] from 
which all beings, as unities of sense, spring, and to which 
all of them refer back, we can see in advance that history is 
the ultimate scene of sense and being. 
The historical horizon in and through which every being 
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discloses itself is "implied in our given present horizon". 
The historical time in and through which every being as sense 
is self-advancing or being advanced, that is, it is stamped 
with temporal or historical mark, is concentrated or gravi-
tated at "our present". Every being as an always-advancing 
-forward shows itself at "our present". "Our present" 
presents the primordial unity of time which is derivatively 
partitioned into the past, the present and the future. Since 
it is the essential form of the historical lifeworld, it is 
responsible for the tradition, that is, the handing down and 
creating of spiritual products. It is itself cultural or 
historical. 
We are going to elucidate the temporal or historical 
structure of the "our present" in two ways: first in what 
manner it is a "present" and then "our" present. 
[T]he whole of cultural present, understood as a 
totality, "implies" the whole of cultural past in 
an undetermined but structurally determined gener-
ality.... [I]t implies a continuity of pasts which 
imply one another, each in itself being a past 
cultural present. And this whole continuity is a 
unity of t r a d i t i o n a l i z a t i o n up to the present, 
which is our present as traditional!zing itself in 
flowing-static vitality (OrG, Cr. AppVI p.371, Kr. 
pp.379-380). 
A cultural present is a totality which synthesizes all 
sense-formations and sense-interconnections. And these forma-
tions and interconnections are themselves historical, that is 
to say, they stretch out and advance along their own histori-
cal time. So each cultural present presents in a unifying 
nexus all the sense as having a historical past and projecting 
towards a historical future and merges them into the one 
historical time. Therefore, concretely speaking, every cul-
tural present is an absolute primordial centre which manifests 
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everything and manifests them with a historicity. Abstractly 
speaking it is that to which everything converges, in which 
everything presents and from which everything projects. In 
this sense, a cultural present can be called a historical 
present. All sense-formations and sense-interconnections have 
thus been shown to be essentially dwelling in the historical 
time and totalized in a historical present. What about the 
historical presents themselves? How do they connect to one 
another? Two historical presents cannot be conceived as two 
things existing side by side simultaneously. Each historical 
present is an absolute which fuses everything and furnishes 
historical time. By what right can we distinguish different 
historic^al presents, not to speak of inquiring into their 
connection? "What is historically primary in itself is our 
present" (OrG, Cr. AppVI p.373, Kr. p.382) . We always live in 
our present historical present which is the absolute of the 
absolutes. Yet it never closes itself up but refers back to 
other past historical presents and anticipates other future 
historical presents. In addition, every other historical 
present is meant as one which refers back and anticipates• 
That is, the present historical present "implies a continui-
ty of^ pasts which imply one another". Each past historical 
present itself involves a continuity of its past historical 
presents. So the present historical present implies a 
continuity of continuities. This continuity, which contin-
ues something instead of annihilates it, must be a unity of 
past historical presents and the series of continuity each 
of them bears. Husserl uses the word "traditionalization" 
for the continuity of historical presents. All past tradi— 
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tionalization is unifiedly traditionalized in our present 
outside which no tradition is possible. Our present histor-
ical present is the traditionalizing itself. 
Concisely speaking, our analysis of history can be divid-
ed into two levels: the sense and the historical present. (1) 
All senses are synthesized and each is totalized in a histori— 
cal present as a totality which displays a historical time 
without which no sense is able to advance, i.e., without which 
no sense can be. (2) All historical presents are unified and 
each is traditionalized in our present historical present as 
traditionalizing itself. Senses and historical present are 
totalized and traditionalized up to our present. A sense 
always signifies an unending movement ceaselessly advancing 
forward which is "undetermined but structurally determined". 
The whole past is nothing but that which is totalized at the 
present as the nourishing soil from which a future is project— 
ed. This totalization and projection are performed in an 
unity of our present which permits the entire operation to be 
indefinite but structurally definite. Indeed, this entire 
operation is our present itself. And history is nothing but 
the unending movement of traditionalization of past historical 
presents and creation of future historical presents. "History 
is from the start nothing other than the vital movement of the 
coexistence and the interweaving of original formations and 
sedimentations of sense" (OrG, Cr. AppVI p.371, Kr. p.380). 
§2. Horizon as The Concrete Form of History 
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Our present historical present exercises the above-
explored essential function, that is, exercises itself, 
under the form of horizon. It exists as a historical hori— 
zon which is the world—horizon, always open, always pregiven 
and prescientific, and forever the constant functioning soil 
of any activity and work. We are and must be conscious of 
the world so long as we are able to attend to particular 
actualities, knowledge and value: 
We always already know of our present world and that 
we live in it, always surrounded by an openly endless 
horizon of unknown actualities. This knowing, as 
horizon—certainty•••• All not—；knowing concerns the 
unknown world, which yet exists in advance for us 
as world, as the hoirizon of all questions at the 
p r e s e n t and thus also all q u e s t i o n s w h i c h are 
specifically historical. These are the questions 
_which concerns men, as those who act and create in 
their communal coexistence in the world and trans-
form the constant cultural face of the world (OrG, 
Cr. AppVI pp.373-4, Kr. p.382). 
Every single human communal spiritual gesture, every single 
move, is historical, that is, synthetized with other sense-
formations and totalized at the present and projected toward a 
future, by means of the horizonal structure of the formations 
themselves. All not-knowing and, following from it, all know-
ing which is the proper counterpart of not—：knowing are dis — 
played or conducted within an always already working horizon-
knowing. The horizon-consciousness legitimizes actualities, 
knowledge, value, and so forth, in short, unites of validi-
ties, since each of them is legitimized so long as it is woven 
together with both things from its own category and from 
others, and forms a coherent nexus starting from itself as 
centre of reference. This consciousness also lays out the 
directions and ways for further determination of each unity of 
63 
I 香 港 中 文 大 學 阅 當 你 欣 ^ 
validities, for more explicit delineation of the nexus of 
validities of each unity. We can see that the former signifies 
the centredness whereas the latter signifies the openness of 
the horizon. Horizon is already at work for every single move 
because a move must be a move within a horizon, that si, a 
move is necessarily horizonal in character. In this manner, 
Husserl contends that horizon is the presupposition of all 
human experience and endeavour: 
This knowing, as horizon-certainty, is not something 
learned.•• the horizon-certainty had to be already 
there in order to be capable of being laid out the-
matically,- it is already presupposed in order that we 
can seek to know what we do not know (OrG. Cr.AppVI 
p. 374, Kr. p. 382) 
The so-called presupposition should not be miscontrued as the 
formal condition of possibility which prescribes all possible 
experience, imposes itself outwardly upon some given manifold, 
and whose meaning can be singled out though it never dwells in 
a region different from experience. Horizon is nothing outside 
the interwoven experience and endeavour of human existence; it 
is only the stretching out of them. We live through the hori-
zon concretely. 
Making more explicit what is already there in the above 
exposition, the two mutual and interenveloping characteristics 
of horizon, namely, centredness and opennedd, receives their 
historical setting. The centredness signifies the inheritance 
and preservation of old spiritual formations whereas the 
openness signifies the creation of new ones. Horizon displays 
the dialectic between the centredness and the openness, be-
tween a definite source and an indefinite stretch, which 
furnishes history with its form. The definite source in this 
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case is our present historical while the indefinite stretch is 
the totalization and traditionalization on the one hand and 
the projection and creation on the other. History is then the 
dialectic of the definite absolute and concrete historical 
present and the indefinite mutual implication of totalization 
and projection. All beings, as senses, as unities of validi-
ty, are stretched in the historical time, that is, are dis— 
played in the dialectic of our present and its totalization 
and projection. Hence, we can say that history is the ultimate 
scene of being and sense. Everything is historical in the 
sense that it, either taking separately or communally with 
other beings, draws its entire history up to the present as 
inheritance from which a future is opened. The past instead of 
existing primarily as fact dated with a certain point or 
period in the mundane time, exists as sense at the present for 
the projecting of a future in the phenomenological time. The 
present, which totalizes the past so as a future is opened, is 
nothing but the projecting of the past toward the future. And 
the future is what the past thrusts towards at the present. It 
is horizon that accomplishes all these. The following passage 
from Derrida lucidly and elegantly articulates Husserl‘s 
insight into the bearing of the notion of horizon may assume 
on matters concerning experience in historical time: 
Horizon is the always-already-there of a future 
which keeps the indetermination of its infinite 
openness intact(even though this future was announced 
to consciousness)• As structural determination of 
every material indeterminacy, a horizon is always 
virtually present in every experience; for it is at 
once the unity and the incompletion for that experi-
ence 一 一 the a n t i c i p a t e d u n i t y in every 
incompletion.•• The notion of horizon thus makes the 
a priori and the teleogical coincide (Intro, p.117). 
Thanks to horizon, history as the vital movement of sense and 
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being attains its form, namely, the dialectic of our present 
and the mutual implication of traditionalization and creation, 
which is yet concretely lived through in our human experience. 
So we can say that horizon is the concrete form of history. 
We have then made clear that the pure history as an 
advent of sense itself displays a historical time. The histor-
ical temporality, or, in short, the historicity endures 
through the dialectic of our living historical present and the 
mutual implication of totalization and projection. Precisely 
because of its being a horizon, the surrounding lifeworld as 
the ultimate horizon of all being and sense. Every human 
expei^ence and activity stretches themselves themselves out 
within the pure history. Everything happens must happen within 
the historical lifeworld. Everything is historical. 
§3. Pure History and Real History 
All these having been secured in our insight, the rela-
tion between the pure history and the real history could be 
determined more precisely. Starting with some commonplaces 
which are by no means devoid of throughout our presentation up 
till now, the pure history signifies an advent of sense while 
the real history is a concatenation of facts； the former 
engenders a lived-through phenomenological historical time 
while the latter occurs within the naive, mundane cosmic time; 
the former gives birth to being and sense while the latter 
takes an abstract moment of being, namely, bare fact, which 
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endows inherently with no sense or meaning, for the being 
itself. Different sense-postures and sense-advances mutually 
imply each other and are totalized together and traditional-
ized up tio our present, so as to thrust towards a future. 
Whereas the future events are linked to each other by causal 
relation in a factual space-time. As we have shown, sense and 
being are fundamentally historical in a purely transcendental 
manner, from which other modes of beings are derives subse-
quently. It follows that the fact and the causal relation of 
the real history is conceivable only after the sense and the 
sense-interconnection has already been at work. The pure 
history is primordial whereas the real history is derivative. 
Now, jto all these which attempt every effort to contrast the 
pure and the real history as sharply as possible, we should 
supplement with connector which bridges the two kinds of 
history. Actually, the so-called history of fact is not so 
inuch a kind by itself as an abstract moemnt of the sense-
movement, as we have already pointed out. More radically 
speaking, even the notion of fact is itself a spiritual forma-
tion instituted in the human sense-history, which serves 
certain theoretical or practical purposes and exercises cer-
tain functions. Each event of fact necessarily signifies an 
advent of sense just as a lingual sign is primarily a sedimen-
tation which points back to original formation. Just as the 
primordial function of sign may be forgotten, the fact may be 
deprived of its function as an index of sense and is thereupon 
treated as bare fact, i.e. fact with no inherent sense. In 
this manner, Husserl writes: 
67 
Anything that is shown to be a historical fact ... 
necessarily has its inner structure of sense； but 
especially the motivational interconnections estab-
lished about it in terms of every understanding have 
deep, further and further - reaching implications 
which must be interregated, disclosed (Org, Cr. App. 
yi, P.371, Kr, p.380) 
Far from speaking arbitrarily, we dare hold fast that various 
texts of Husserl suggest that the so-called bare fact existed 
"objectively", there is only a human spiritual product. Histo-
ry does not reside in the so-called bare fact, which does not 
even exist as what the concept claims to be, but in our human 
participation, penetrated with understanding, and so eventual-
ly expressed in language. The praxis, the theoria and the 
logo^merge together to furnish the actual subject matter of 
history. An advance of sense is sedimented in a historical 
practice, articulated with understanding and hence fixed in 
language, which must be reactivated back to its original 
sense-advance and sense-interconnection. The deep and far-
reaching sense-implication must be interrogated, disclosed. 
Hence, in conclusion, the real history of fact is derivative 
with respect to the pure history of sense; and it is a sedimen-




THE SOURCE OF IDEALITY 
A sense has already been determined as an absolute ideal 
Objectivity, that is, as an absolute ideality and absolute 
Objectivity. We have so far only laid bare the apriori con-
crete and constitutive conditions for sense as absolute Objec-
tivity, that is, for how sense can objectify itself. Further-
inore, this obj ectif ication has shown to be nothing but the 
historical constitution of sense and, accompanied with this, 
historicity has shown to be an essential mark of every being 
and 晶nse. We are now suitably entitled to attempt to eluci-
date the apriori concrete condition for absolute ideality. 
The conditions of possibility which at once de jure and 
de facto constitute absolute Objectivity are the surrounding 
lifeworld, the human community, the common language horizon, 
the pure intention of writing, the capacity of sedimentation 
and reactivation, and finally the possibility of univocal 
expressibility. All these concrete conditions are neces-
sarily not independent existents but interrelated possibili— 
ties "ot performance and achievement, or concisely, of pure 
activity itself. What is the at once de jure and de facto 
condition for absolute ideality? As concrete condition, it 
must be an activity which actually produces the ideality. 
Husserl terms this activity "idealization": "Ideas arise 
through a peculiar sort of spiritual accomplishment: ideali-
zation" (Cr. AppV p.348, Kr. p.361). In the following we 
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try to illumine the process of idealization and the ideali-
ty, and some related problems. 
The ideality belongs exclusively to and marks the domain 
of science and philosophy. Here philosophy does not refer to 
the different philosophical schools, different systematic doc-
trines, different sets of problems, and so forth； it is taken 
in its primordial and ultimate sense: the all-encompassing 
science of the totality of what is. And sciences are not 
treated as separate yet logically connected systematic re-
searches of different yet ontically connected regions of 
beings; they are unified under the universal task of philoso— 
phy. As we have already explored, the ideality is first of 
all an omnitemporal identity in itself. "[I]t produces in any 
—rs �” 
number of acts of production by one person or any number of 
persons something identically the same, identical in sense 
and validity" (PCH, Cr. AppI p.278, Kr, p.323). Besides, what 
have been shown to be valid can serve to produce higher ideal-
ities, which in turn produce other higher idealities. In this 
way, "an infinity [marks] off as a universal field of work, as 
the domain of the science. Science, then, signifies the 
idea of an infinity of tasks" (Ibid.). Finally, the ideali-
ty innovates an u n c o n d i t i o n a l t r u t h — i n — i t s e l f which is 
absolute and Objective in contrast to the relative and 
subjective prescientific truth. "This involves an infinity 
which gives to each factual confirmation and truth the 
character of being relative, of being a mere approach in 
relation precisely to that infinite horizon in which the 
truth-in-itself counts, so to speak, as an infinitely dis-
tant point" (Ibid., Kr. p.324). We can say that the birth 
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of ideality certifies the birth of science as the one uni-
versal science. In other words, idealization is the primor-
dial philosophical act: it institutes the whole scientific 
culture or culture of truth. Scientific humanity has many 
infinite ideas, including strictly philosophical ones such 
as absolute truths, genuine goods and infinite tasks, and 
scientific ones such as points, straight lines and circles. 
In the Crisis, Husserl usually talks about idealization and 
idealities or ideas in connection with a particular branch 
of the universal philosophy, namely, mathematics, or more 
precisely, geometry. But Husserl claims that the mathemati-
cal idealities and their corresponding idealizations always 
have an exemplary signification. The following will pursue 
an clarification of the related problems of idealization, 
taking geometry as example. 
§1. Idealization and Imaginative Variation 
At the moment when the idealizing act breaks through the 
psychic realm all the conditions for absolute objectivity 
should have already been given. The cultural surrounding 
world^ can be taken abstractly as a world of "things", although 
"thingness" or "coirpoireality" can never exhaust it. And 
regarding a thing or a body, one can clearly see that it has 
spatiotemporal shape and material[stoffliche] qualities. In 
addition, one is always capable of paying attention only to 
the shape-aspect. Further, the practical goals of the 
prescientific life prefer some shapes rather than others. 
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Correspondingly, technical praxis and methods of measurement 
always attempt to produce these preferred shapes and improve 
them. For e x a m p l e , s u r f a c e s and e d g e s , m o r e or l e s s 
"smooth" and "even", are, as it can easily be imagined, 
p r e f e r r e d s h a p e s suiting p r a c t i c a l ends ； then, again, 
straight lines and even surfaces are preferred. So far, we 
have still b e e n d w e l l i n g in the p r e s c i e n t i f i c life and 
spiritual accomplishments. Husserl writes in a parentheses: 
..proceeding from the factual, an essential form becomes 
recognizable through a method of variation" (Org, Cr. AppVI 
P- 376, Kr .p. 3 84) . Is this "essential form" which is ac-
quired through varying the factual the absolute ideality? 
Is this "method of variation" the idealization? Even if one 
possesses this kind of "essential form", one still remains 
captive to "the finitely known and unknown spaces and times 
as finite elements" (工bid.), and has no "geometrical space, 
mathematical time" (Ibid.). "With his manifold finite shapes 
in their space-time [one] does not yet have geometrical 
shapes, the phoronomic shapes" (Ibid.). Nevertheless, a 
novel spiritual product is to be produced "out of these 
finite elements which serve as material" (Ibid.) ” [The 
shapes, as] formations[Bildungs] developed out of praxis and 
thought of in terms of [gradual] perfection, clearly serve 
only as bases for a new sort of praxis out of which similar-
ly named new formation[Gebilde] grow" (Ibid. ) . How are this 
variation and the resulting essential form determined in 
more detail? The following lines are illuminating in this 
regard: 
No matter how arbitrarily we may transform [the 
actually experienceable] bodies in phantasy, the 
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free and in a certain sense "ideal" possibilities 
we thus obtain are anything but geometrical-ideal 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s : they are not the g e o m e t r i c a l l y 
"pure" shapes which can be inscribed in the ideal 
space... . Thus geometrical space does not signify 
anything like imaginary space•••Fantasy can trans-
form sensible shapes only into other sensible 
shapes (Cr. Pt.I §9a p.25, KR. P.22; my emphasis). 
The above method of variation is an imaginative variation 
which varies upon the actual and possible shapes in our imagi-
nation • The essential form, being "free and in a certain 
sense ‘ideal‘ possibilities", cannot be identified with any 
sensible shape, but it is not yet a "pure" shape. These 
imaginary possibilities are accompanied by the imaginary 
space. A prescientific man may in his natural life encounter 
many round sensible things. By imagination he is able to 
extract _froin these sensible shapes the concept of "roundness" 
which more or less corresponds to them in sensible intuition. 
But this "roundness" is not to be confused with the geometri-
cal ideality of the "circle", although the former serves as 
material basis out of which the latter is constructed. So 
far, three levels can be distinguished with respect to shapes: 
the sensible shape, the imaginary shape and the pure shape. 
Correspondingly, there are three kinds of space: the finite 
sensible space, the imaginary space and the ideal space. And 
three kinds of capacity are responsible respectively: sensible 
intuition, imagination and idealization. Those from the first 
level are unities of validity of practical life and hence, as 
such, they are not elements of science. On the second and 
third levels, scientific research is possible. The second 
level gives rise to descriptive natural science such as geog-
raphy whereas the third level gives rise to exact geometry. 
The essential form or imaginary possibility, e.g., roundness, 
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is by its very definition inexact and vague, which, neverthe-
less, satisfactorily suits the purpose of descriptive science. 
This essential form is called in the Ideas I morphological 
type or morphological essence (Ideas I, §74, p.166). A mor-
phological type is "essentially, rather than accidentally, 
inexact and consequently also non-mathematical (Ibid.). 
However, this inexactness by no means makes them defective: 
If the aim is to give appropriate conceptual expres-
sion to the intuitionally given essential character-
istics of intuitionally given physical things, that 
means precisely that the latter must be taken as 
they are given. And they are given precisely as 
fluid,- and the typical essences can become seized 
upon as exemplified in them only in immediately 
analytic eidetic intuition (Ibid.). 
Hence, besides sensibility which intuits the sensible shapes 
withTn the finite space—time, mankind, possesses the capacity 
of imagination which intuits the essentially inexact and vague 
morphological essence within an imaginary morphological space-
time . And a descriptive science is always possible which 
operates with morphological concepts and aims at a conceptual 
determination of the sensible shapes. 
§2. Idealization as Infinitization 
4 、 
All these, that is, all the prescientific spiritual 
accoinplishments and their corresponding accomplishing capaci-
ty, are "always already there, already abundantly developed 
and pregiven to the philosopher who did not yet know geometry 
but who should be conceivable as its inventor" (Org, Cr. 
AppVI p.376, Kr. p.384) It is evident that an absolute 
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ideality is "a product arising out of an idealizing, spirit-
ual act, one of 丨pure丨 thinking•“ (Org, Cr. AppVI p.377, Kr 
pp. 384-5) . It can be seen that even the morphological type, 
the descriptive science and the imaginative variation serve 
only as the material basis of the breakthrough of the abso-
lute ideality. Then the spiritual act which accomplishes it 
must not be equated with imagination, not to speak of sensi-
bility; it is the pure thinking. 
The following passages give us a more concrete determina-
tion of the idealizing act and the absolute ideality: 
Geometrical concepts are "ideal" concepts, express-
ing something which cannot be "seen"； their "ori — 
gin" and therefore their content are essentially 
other than those of descriptive concepts as con-
cepts which express, not "ideals", but essences 
_ drawn immediately from intuition s iitipl ic iter • 
Exact concepts have as their correlates essences 
which have the characteristic of '"ideas" in the 
Kantian sense. Contrasted with these ideas, or 
ideal essences, we find morphological essences as 
the correlates of descriptive concepts (Ideas I, 
§74, p.166). 
The absolute ideality is nothing but idea in the Kantian 
sense. It is something which cannot be "seen": no possible 
sensible intuition and imagination can present it to a con-
sciousness in empirical use. 
That ideation which yields ideal essences, as ideal 
"limits" which is essentially impossible to be found 
崎 in any sensuous intuition but which morphological 
( � e s s e n c e s "approach" more or less closely without ever 
reaching them - this ideation is fundamentally dif— 
ferent in its essence from the seizing upon an es-
sence by simple "abstraction" in which a salient 
"moment" is raised into the region of essences as 
something essentially vague, as something typical 
(Idea I, §74, p.167)• 
The determination of the absolute ideality as Idea (in the 
Kantian sense) goes further: the absolute ideality is a limit 
towards which morphological essences approach but never reach. 
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And the ideation, the process which brings forth Ideas, is 
strictly distinguished from the factual mental abstraction 
or the approaching of morphological essence in imagination. 
Nevertheless in these texts, which are from the static phase 
of phenomenology, the constituting capacity of idealization 
is not sufficiently admired and therefore its correlate, 
though being determined as Idea, is not so distinguishable 
from the eidos as one may assume. 
Let us read some texts from the Crisis; 
[W]e can understand that, out of the praxis of per-
fecting, of freely pressing toward the horizon of 
conceivable[erdenklicher] perfecting "again and 
agsin"[Immei:—wieder], limit shapes emerge toward 
which the particular series of perfectings tend, as 
toward invariant and never attainable poles (Cr. Pt. 
I, §9a, p.26, Kr. p.23)• 
The I d e a l i z i n g act maintains a closer relation with the 
praxis of perfecting than as suggested in the earlier texts. 
The p e r f e c t i n g is not performed in the sensible or the 
imaginative realm but "the horizon of conceivable perfecting 
again and again". The "conceivability" Husserl stresses in 
this sentence, as it is clear in the context, cannot be 
confused with imaginability and any factual mental faculty. 
It is not the correlative of factual man but that of the 
instituting thinker who constitutes the Idea in the consti— 
tilting acts. And this thinker, as instituting thinker as 
such, is free to perfect again and again without an end. 
This free act of perfecting cannot be equated to any factual 
act which must encounter limit. 
One can always make round things rounder and rounder by 
the given technical art. One can always make irepiresentations 
of round things rounder and rounder in one's imagination. It 
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is clear that there isn't any round thing or representation of 
round thing which can serve as the limits of round things 
and representations of round things respectively. To every 
given round thing and every given representation of round 
thing, one always suspect that a rounder one can be made or 
imagined. But this suspecting is only an empty anticipation 
of infinite perfection again and again while no fulfilling 
evidence is given which guarantees that any given practical 
intuition aiming at the more perfect could ever be ful-
filled. Husserl writes: "Here the idealizing performance 
begins: the conception of the 'again and again'...in infini-
tum" (Cr. AppV p.346, Kr. p.359). Idealization is the 
removal of all limitation, the infinitization of the fini_ 
tudelDf all perfecting again and again� 
What arises first is the ideal of continuation which 
is repeatable with unconditioned generality, with its 
own evidence, as a freely thinkable and self-evident 
p o s s i b l e i n f i n i t y , r a t h e r than the open 
endlessness[described above]； rather than finite 
iteration, this is iteration within the sphere of the 
unconditional "again and again", of what can be 
renewed with ideal freedom..•. 
Acpcordingly, such an idealization overcomes even the 
limits of our finite capacity for coining to know the 
open world-horizon which continuously accompanies all 
actual, experiential knowing (ibid.). 
Husserl here admits a peculiar sort of evidence of the 
infinity which is freely thinkable and can be freely re — 
turned to. This freedom is itself infinitized: it is an 
ideal freedom. Thus idealization involves the infinitiza— 
tion of mankind through the will and infinitization of the 
human will itself. The limits of our finite capacity is 
overcome in the infinitization of our resolute will to 
overcome. Our finitude is removed in our infinite will to 
be infinite. 
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Thus idealization is a leap to the infinity, an immediate 
presence at the infinite of an infinite number of infinite 
convergent series. And the absolute ideality, the Idea, is 
the infinite limit towards which an infinite number of infi— 
nite series tend. The evidence of this immediate presence is 
itself situated at the infinity since it is resolutely prom-
ised by an ideal free will. And the will is itself idealized 
in and through the promising posture. Now, regarding that an 
evidence of something is the conscious grasping of it in its 
original being—itself—there, the evidence at infinity intended 
by the idealizing act is indeed no evidence at all. The Idea 
can never be given in evidence. It follows that the ideali— 
zation jaust be distinguished from the W e s e n s s c h a u (the 
intuition of an eidos), which indicates an evident givenness 
of something, and correlatively, the Idea from the eidos. 
Although Husserl employs the same word "ideation" to denote 
both the idealization and the Wesensschau in earlier texts, 
its usage is diminished in later texts in proportion to the 
advance from static to genetic problematic. The difference 
between idealization and Wesensschau is: "one can constitute 
an object as a creation, the other can determine it in an 
intuition" (Intro., p.135). Correlatively, an Idea is the 
regulative telos towards which all that which it is an Idea 
of tends but an eidos is the invariant structure all that 
which it is an eidos of participates. The difference is one 
between the constituting and the constituted, the genetic 
and the static. Once an absolute ideality has been consti— 
tuted through an idealizing act, the Wesensschau can intuit 
an eidos. Idealization is the infinite removal of all 
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finitude, the infinite leap to the infinity; it is concrete-
ly constituted in the infinite free will. This will itself 
at the infinity: the human finite will resolves to infini— 
tize itself. This infinitization signifies the radical 
freedom of spirit, the b r e a k t h r o u g h of the theoretical 
attitude from the original natural practical attitude, the 
birth of the infinite historicity of humanity out of the 
finite p r i m o r d i a l and fundamental h i s t o r i c i t y of human 
existence. Absolute ideality is hence constituted. 
However, an idealizing act and its accomplished abso-
lute ideality can be identified only if an intuition of an 
eidos is evidently given. In view of the case that idealiza-
tion^mu^t be performed with an evident consciousness of the 
performing act»s being idealization, an act is idealization 
only if it is guided by a Wesensschau • Correlatively, an 
Idea can be identified or, more radically, constituted, only 
if a corresponding eidos serves as guide. It follows that 
idealization and Idea must be strictly distinguished in 
meaning but are inseparable in happening from Wesensschau 
and eidos. 
After contrasting idealization and Idea with Wesens-
schau and eidos, it is clear that the evidence of an Idea 
(if one would like to predicate evidence upon Idea) must be 
strictly distinguished from the evidence of an eidos. The 
eidos has determinate content to grasp in intuitively evi-
dent m a n n e r whereas the idea regulates all d e t e r m i n a t e 
content but itself has no content for intuitive grasping. 
The former can be presented in evidence while the latter 
cannot——not because its content lies at the infinity but 
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because it has no content at all. Then, perhaps, we should 
ask r a d i c a l l y : by what right does one claim that an in 
principle invisible Idea exist, even only juridically prior 
to the visible eidos, the sensibly visible individual and 
morphological essence? But Husserl resolutely turns the 
matter around: the eidos, the sensible individual and the 
imaginary morphological essence exist only because they are 
tending towards the Idea in an infinite movement. They exist 
only in and through their self-moving• It is the idea that 
grants being to the real, the invisible that makes something 
visible. The Idea is the invisible ground of visibility. 
Still more radically, we can ask: how does the Idea, the One 
unifying the infinitely many realizations, each one is by 
itself an infinite movement? An Husserlian response is not 
out of our disposal: the Idea, the One is the unity. An Idea 
never exists outside the total infinite movement but inside 
it to unify the movement as a whole. It is the unitary sense 
inside the total infinite movement.^ 
Now let us turn to idealization. Since an intuitional 
performance must be measured by its intentional achievement, 
the idealizing act, accomplishing Idea, which has no intui— 
tive content in principle, is indescribable with respect to 
how it actually works. Idealization takes the factual (both 
the sensible and the imaginary) as material basis and leaps 
l.Note that Ide巧s are given a hierarchy. All actual and possible sensi-
ble round things and the morphological essence "roundness" tend 
towards the Idea "circle" which is determined in the eidos "circle". 
And the Idea "circle" itself participates in geometry as an infinite 
movement toward the Idea of geometry. Again, the latter is itself an 
abstract moment in the infinite task of episteme, in the infinite 
rational knowing towards the Idea of philosophy. 
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with no further due to an infinite pole, or a limit. It is 
the infinite removal of all finitude, the infinite leap to 
the infinity,* it is concretely constituted in the infinite 
free will. This will is itself at the infinity: the human 
finite will resolves to infinitize itself. This infinitiza— 
tion signifies the radical freedom of spirit, the break-
through of the theoretical attitude from the original natu-
ral practical attitude, the birth of the infinite historici-
ty of humanity out of the finite, primordial and fundamental 






Let us glance over what we have obtained, collect them 
together in the present in order to manifest them - and inevi-
tably transform them too - so as to summon up our strength for 
further thrusts. 
The at once primordial and ultimate history is a history 
of sense. An original sense is advancing or is being advanced 
ceaselessly in an unending movement towards a teleological 
sense. A history is the infinite lively forward development 
of a sense from an origin to a telos. The original sense is 
once constituted or instituted for its first time in and 
through concrete intentional acts as the unique total sense of 
the history it displays. The origin and the telos are nothing 
outside the history as the advent of the sense. 
This singular sense may be differentiated into those 
plural senses, as we may speak of history as the implication 
of different senses instead of history as the development of a 
sense. The sense in singular as well as in plural can be 
determined as ideal Objectivity. The concrete genesis of the 
historicity of sense is then transformed as the concrete gene_ 
sis of absolute Objectivity and absolute ideality. 
To the apriori and concrete conditions of possibility for 
the absolute Objectivity. The problematic can be tackled 
under two aspects: the "how" of origin and the "how" of 
tradition, that is, how a spiritual formation can be objecti-
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fied and how it can function within tradition. To the first 
aspect. Language and the living present are the required 
conditions. (1) A three-in-one and one-as-three horizon must 
always be already at work in order to objectify a psychically 
valid, spiritual formation: the cominon language, the mankind 
and the surrounding lifeworld, the first and the second stand-
ing out against the second the third respectively. The sur-
rounding lifeworld is always the universal, formal and yet 
cultural world-horizon in and through which each being dis-
closes itself as interwoven with other beings, that is, as a 
unity of validities, as a sense. And the mankind articulates 
itself against the world—horizon as the universal, formal and 
yet cultural community—horizon in and through which all the 
actual and possible human historico-cultural acts, which lay 
out the being-sense, display themselves in an intertwined 
manner. Finally, the common language as horizon, articulated 
itself against the mankind-horizon and the world—horizon, 
anchors all the actual and possible human acts and all being— 
senses in speech and writing which are understandable by 
"everyone". (2) The living present is an absolute here and 
now which constitutes a temporal object through synthesizing 
the elapsed phase, the now-phase and the coining phase of the 
immailent acts and contents, given respectively by the reten-
tion, the central impression and the pretention. By means of 
the living present and the common language, real contents 
adhered to real moments in real time-duration is objectified. 
First of all, the living present and, based upon it, the 
recollection furnish the formation with intira~psychical valid-
ity. Then speaking determines the formation as inter—psychi— 
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cally valid in reciprocal lingual understanding within speak— 
ing community. And, finally, writing sets the absolute valid-
ity of the spiritual formation. Hence the absolute Objectivi-
ty of a pure sense is constituted in a certain manner of 
speaking. The absolute Objectivity is its pure possibility of 
being written down which is constituted in the pure intention— 
al act of writing. The absolute transcendental subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity are lingual fundamentally. The pure 
writing must originate through a lingual flesh but a lingual 
flesh must be factually given with a lingual body. Therefore, 
a pure truth-sense is constituted through being sediinented. 
To the second aspect of the conditions of absolute Objec-
tivity. The problem of origin and that of tradition are in 
reality "fused together. A sedimentation is a writing—down of 
the pure truth-sense into lingual signs, that is, it trans一 
forms the original mode of being of the sense-formation. A 
reactivation relives the original producing activity and hence 
the pure truth-sense through tracing back the passive meaning 
awakened by the lingual sign. The lingual signs are primarily 
presented to the consciousness as a reproductive transforma-
tion of an original truth-sense, that is, they refer to an 
original genesis. In this way, a tradition, in which an 
origfnal total sense preserves itself through self—advancing, 
is instituted: a new sense is produced from the totality of 
sediinented meaning which is reactivated at the present. In 
turn, a sense can be sediinented and reactivated because every 
being, as sense, as validity of human activities, is lingually 
expressible, capable of being written down. In other words, 
it is precisely because every human being lives essentially 
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with the common language, every human being is a lingual 
being, that sedimentation and reactivation are possible. More 
precisely, it is because a sense is written down in firm 
sentences, is univocally expressed, that sedimentation and 
reactivation are possible. Hence, a tradition is constituted 
by means of original genesis, sedimentation and reactivation, 
which, in turn, are made concretely possible by the univocity 
of language. 
Let us conclude the problem of the absolute Objectivity. 
The origin and the tradition interenvelope dialectically: an 
origin must disclose in a tradition and a tradition must 
develop an origin. The conditions for an origin have already 
been shown to be the common language (which articulates 
agaiiist the mankind and the surrounding lifeworld) and the 
living present. Since the language is used to deposit (and 
simultaneously generate) an original sense, we can now further 
infer that it is univocal. The conditions for a tradition 
have already been shown to be sedimentation and reactivation, 
and ultimately univocity. Sedimentation and reactivation, 
mediated with language, must be brought into light in the 
living present: the reactivation is a present activity which 
synthesizes and presents all the sediments at the present for 
furtHer upsurge. The irreducible conditions for the absolute 
Objectivity are thus univocity and the living present. We 
must have a remark on the univocity. It is in itself a telos 
at the infinity that regulates all factual languages which are 
essentially equivocal. Following from this, both sedimenta-
tion and reactivation are posed as infinite task, so is an 
original genesis. The univocity as telos involves an ideali— 
85 
zation or infinitization which is structurally identical with 
that elucidated in the problem of ideality. 
Now, to the apriori and concrete conditions of possibili-
t y for the absolute ideality. Similar to the sense, the 
absolute.ideality, or the Idea in the Kantian sense, may be 
taken in the plural, as we speak of various Ideas in a histo-
ry, or in the singular, as we speak of the Idea of history. 
An Idea is concretely constituted through idealization. First 
of all, idealization must be distinguished from any human 
factual faculty. An Idea is neither a sensible individual nor 
a morphological essence which varies from each individual. 
Correlatively, idealization is neither sensible intuition nor 
iniaginatioii which gives rise to an inexact morphological 
essence/ Nevertheless, the sensible and the imaginable serve 
as the material basis of idealization. Besides, idealization 
inust be distinguished even from the Wesensschau. an Idea from 
an eidos. An Idea has no content to be intuited and hence no 
finite evidence whereas an eidos possesses definite content 
which can be intuited in finite evidence. An Idea is an 
infinite limit-pole which regulates all realization of it 
whereas an eidos is an invariant structure which lays under 
all example of it. Idealization creates as an Idea whereas a 
Weserisschau intuits an eidos. Only after an ideal object has 
already been constituted by the idealization can the Wesens-
schau intuit it as an eidos. Nevertheless, only if guided by 
a Wesensschau which presents definite content, can idealiza— 
tion creates a limit having no content at all. Finally, Idea 
and idealization are determined more positively. The concept 
of Idea is refined to its last determination. First, it is 
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the invisible ground of visibility: the visible exists only as 
a moment of the infinite movement towards the invisible Idea. 
At last, it is the unity of the infinite movement: it exists 
so long as it displays itself in the movement as the unitary 
sense of it. And idealization is the infinitization of the 
finitude of the perfecting again—and—again• It is the con-
crete condition of possibility for the absolute ideality. 
Here we must have a remark. The idealization, the infinitiza-
tion of the human finitude, can never be given in finite 
evidence/ rather, it is promised an infinite evidence by the 
will. It signifies that the human will resolves to infinitize 
itself. 
Then, univocity, the living present and idealization are 
the Constitutive conditions for the absolute ideal Objectivi-
ty. They make the sense constituted as an origin, instituted 
as a tradition and legitimized as a telos. They concretely 
and a priori make possible the historicity of sense. 
After making explicit the condition, we now turn our gaze 
upon history itself. The surrounding life-world, the mankind 
and the common language together as a horizon are determined 
as temporal or historical. That every being is essentially a 
sense-unity of human experience and endeavour, that it is 
necessarily fixed in language - all these are performed within 
the phenomenological historical time. A historical present is 
an absolute primordial centre in and through which all senses 
are synthesized and each is totalized as a totality from which 
an upsurge is projected. Our present historical present is 
the absolute of all absolutes which unifies all historical 
presents and traditionalizes each of them. Then, history is 
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"the vital movement of the coexistence and the interweaving of 
original formations and sedimentations of sense"(cited above, 
Ch. IV, §1, p.49). History achieves this essential work of 
itself by means of its concrete form as a horizon: the two 
mutual and interenveloping characteristics, namely, centred-
ness and openness. The form of history is then a dialectic of 
our absolute and concrete historical present and the mutual 
implication of totalization and projection. All being, as 
sense, all human experience and endeavour, and all speech and 
writing stretch themselves out along history, gravitate to— 
wards the living historical present, and radiate towards a 
living future. History is the all—encompassing ultimate 
horizon of being and man. But this elucidation which treats 
sense exclusively as Object remains abstract. We must now 
merge it with results from 七 h e analysis of sense as ideality• 
In light of that theory, history is first determined as an 
infinite movement of finite senses towards an Idea, an infi— 
nite and teleological sense. Yet the finite sense is in 
itself nothing but a striving towards the Idea,- it receives 
its sense and being from the Idea. Finally, the Idea as the 
regulative telos of the infinite movement is nothing but the 
unitary sense of the movement. In this way, all being and 
sense infinitize themselves and unify with each other to 
compose an infinite movement. The human knowing or will—to 
know poses for itself an infinite task to overcome its finite 
c a p a c i t y i t infinitizes itself in an infinite movement. This 
human will to infinitize is nothing more and nothing less than 
the reason: it constitutes the ideal truth-sense and unifies 
the infinite movement with the Idea as sense, and elevates 
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finite mankind to infinite humanity. And it is only the 
unifying movement itself. Hence, in conclusion, history is an 
infinite movement of beings as senses which are unified as 
announcing an unique sense running through from the origin to 
the telos, and are unified as so and so only at every present 
through the primordial living present which at one stroke 
totalizes all senses at the present and projects them for-
wards. Being and man are historical through and through and 
rational through and through. Reason is historical and history 
is rational. History is the infinite and all—encompassing 
ultimate horizon of being and man. 
§2. Going Beyond 
are now entitled to see that a principle of presence 
dominates Husserl‘s phenomenology in its most manifest inten-
tion, yet a trace of absence always already slips into the 
text. (Derrida called the entire philosophy a metaphysics of 
presence.) For Husserl, being is always sense or object which 
discloses itself brightly and maintains itself as an identity. 
The primordial mode of being is presence. The language and 
the living historical present, as conditions for object, only 
make being present. Every being as sense manifests itself as 
a centre of a nexus of human performance, as a focus of a 
heritage of background and forward mutual envelopment, which 
is lingually expressible. And our human spiritual endeavour 
always recieves nourishment from the tradition and develops 
itself forward - the sense is always historical. The two 
irreducible conditions complement each other to constitute the 
historical sense: the living historical present provides the 
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historicity in totalization which is at once creation, and 
language anchors the primordial temporalization in sedimenta-
tion and reactivation. Every being is then a sense, an object 
which preserves its identity in being a unity of historical 
Abschattunqen. Every being signifies a presence within a 
horizon, and ultimately, within the one historical language— 
man-world-horizon. Every being is a present, as a being 
presents itself presently, which presents all the absent up to 
the present. The living present is the presence of being and 
the being of presence. Being is presence. 
The determination of being as presence runs through all 
its essential steps and encounters its strongest resistance in 
the constitution of the ideal object. One could always appeal 
to iBciSental factual limitation for an explanation if the 
prescientific object never appears to be a centre of human 
experience, a focus of backward and forward mutual envelop-
ment. But one could no longer do so in face of the ideal 
object which is immune to factuality. Besides language and 
the living present, idealization is also the condition for an 
ideal object. Does the cooperative work of the three success-
fully determine being as presence? At first sight, it seems 
that idealization brings in a principle of infinity which 
inalce这 being as absence instead of presence. At this point, we 
should point out that even the constitutive language involves 
an idealizations it is the univocal language, that is, the 
infinite telos of all languages which are essentially equivo— 
cal. Does the infinitization operated in these two theoreti-
cal g e s t u r e s r e a l l y o b l i t e r a t e the p r o j e c t of b e i n g as 
presence? Quite the contrary. Upon the last analysis, an 
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Idea as telos is nothing but the unity of an infinite movement 
in which it displays itself as the unitary sense. The infini— 
ty signifies no infinity of mundane time or distance; rather, 
it is the infinity of the phenomenological time. The infinite 
movement is only the movement which endeavours to unify itself 
but is always advancing forward at the present. History is 
the pure movement, moving in the Living Present through the 
Logos, with the Idea, the One, the unity, the Being as the 
sense, and the Telos which is only the moving itself. Through 
the collaboration of the Logos, the Time, and the Telos, all 
beings and senses "are" in the most concrete and ultimate 
manner: they are together the One Appearing itself; or, in an 
abstract and general manner, every being "is": it is its one 
appearing itself. Only in this way can we say with full 
sincerity: being is presence. 
But only in this way can we say without little frivolous— 
ness: no pure presence. The first point (which explains the 
second) is that although, and just because, the unity, instead 
of being outside of the Appearing, is the self—unifying of the 
Appearing itself as the Living present, which creates all 
beings as a one appearing and the totality of them as the One 
Appearing, this unifying never appears, not even in an appear— 
ing, ( The second point (which explains the first) is that the 
Living present is the primordial absolute, i.e., it is itself 
only if it at one stroke traditionalizes the past present and 
projects the future present as primordial absolutes. A 
present is an primordial absolute, i.e., it is itself only if 
it at one stroke totalizes and advances the senses. The 
senses are the appearings, the totality of senses is the 
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Appearing. Accordingly, a present is a passing of the Appear•— 
ing which always already passes itself. The Living Present is 
the Passing of the passings. Although, and just because, it 
is all—encompassing, it is always in suspense for a next. 
Jointly speaking, the Living Present is the self-unifying of 
the One Appearing, yet the "self" is always on the run. The 
Logos, only in and through which the Living present or the 
unifying works, always intervenes and interrupts it: the 
living, the unifying is always lost in the mist of lingual 
gestures. Presence is supplemented with absence. Being 
should be crossed: ；Jiaiiig^ . 
Is it not the case or is it not true that being is scat-
tered over the human deeds instead of being a centre of it? 
Is it not real or not true that being is exiled in the back-
ward and forward reference instead of being a focus of it? Is 
it not real or not true that: being is dispersed in the lin-
gual shade and shift instead of being their unity? But: what 
is the ground to speak of Being and Truth here? What is the 
ground to speak of the ground here? After they have been 
supplemented with the cross: and g J X Q ^ , never is 
it a matter to decide between the presence and the absence 
through our life. What matters is the question: which one 
should be played with in the logos. However, absence emerges 
so far only in connection with presence in a logos which is 
dominantly in intention only by the latter. We can say that 
this logos is one in w h i c h the w o r d s of a b s e n c e and of 
presence shade into each other and outside which no logos of 
absence or logos of presence can be formed. All we have is an 
at once continuous interplay of presence and absence in the 
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logos. The presence and the absence are played at once. 
Still more radical, should and can our life and the logos be 
separated? From the very beginning, the philosophical logos 
speaks for and listens to nothing but life. It is the origi-
nation of the philosophical life. Now the long repressed 
absence is released from the presence, and therefore, the life 
itself, being a philosophical word, is supplemented. Should 
we then abandon the life in the playing of logos? Should life 
and logos be interrelated in a supplemented style? 
The most serious, most basic and most profound problem of 
all is: how do we play with the logos? How do we relate our 
life to the logos? To this mystery, the present writing, 
regarding its initial purpose and limit, is to be silent. We 
end Here in a conclusion - but a conclusion having a recapitu-
lation and a going beyond only. The conclusion is lost and 
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